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WRONGFUL DISCHARGE AND FEDERAL 
PREEMPTION: NUCLEAR WHISTLEBLOWER 
PROTECTION UNDER STATE LAW AND SECTION 210 
OF THE ENERGY REORGANIZATION ACT 
Thomas E. Egan* 
No doubt there is tension between the conclusion that safety regulation 
is the exclusive concern of the federal law and the conclusion that a 
State may nevertheless award damages based on its own law of lia-
bility. But as we understand what was done over the years in the 
legislation concerning nuclear energy, Congress intended to stand by 
both concepts and to tolerate whatever tension there was between 
them. We can do no less. 
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee COrp.1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A whistle blower is an employee who discloses conduct by his or 
her employer that the employee reasonably believes to be a violation 
of any law, rule, or regulation. 2 Whistle blowers have drawn nearly 
universal praise for helping to ensure that their employers obey the 
law. 3 They perform valuable civic services by revealing information 
that their employers chose to suppress. 4 Employees are in a unique 
* Managing Editor, 1989-90, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
This Comment is dedicated to the staff of the Government Accountability Project, in recog-
nition of their tireless efforts on behalf of nuclear whistleblowers. 
'464 U.S. 238, 256 (1984). 
2 Kohn & Carpenter, Nuclear Whistleblower Protection and the Scope of Protected Activity 
Under Section 210 of the Energy Reorganization Act, 4 ANTIOCH L.J. 73, 74 (1986). 
3 See, e.g., Is Whistle-Blowing the Same as Informing?, 39 Bus. & SOC'y REV. 4, 4-17 
(1981); Nader, An Anatomy of Whistle Blowing, in WHISTLE BLOWING 3 (R. Nader, P. Petkas, 
K. Blackwell eds. 1972). 
4 Is Whistle-Blowing the Same as Informing?, supra note 3, at 5. 
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position to uncover wrongdoing in the workplace. 5 They can tell more 
readily than governmental inspectors whether their employers are 
violating safety standards.6 In recent years, while agency budgets 
have been cut, the employee whistle blower is often the onlS source 
of information about company activities that threaten public health 
and safety.7 The whistleblower thus becomes the public's, and the 
government's, only way of discovering employer misconduct. 8 
Although whistleblowing benefits us all as taxpayers, consumers, 
and workers, whistle blowers nonetheless often suffer for their con-
scientious actions. 9 Employers retaliate against employee whistle-
blowers in various ways.10 Such retaliatory actions may include dis-
charge, demotion, harassment, blacklisting, and other forms of 
discrimination. 11 In recognition of the whistleblowers' plight, Con-
gress and several states have attempted to protect whistleblowers 
from retaliatory discrimination. 
Some states provide discharged whistle blowers with a common-
law cause of action. 12 Other states have enacted statutes designed 
to protect whistle blowers from retaliation by their employers.13 In 
addition, Congress has provided statutory protections for whistle-
blowers. 14 Section 210 of the Energy Reorganization Act15 protects 
nuclear whistleblowers. 16 
Because discharged nuclear whistle blowers have a remedy under 
section 210,17 courts have had to decide whether state remedies are 
5 Andrews, When You Whistle Where You Work . .. , STUDENT LAW., Mar. 1983, at 10, 
11. 
6Id. 
7Id. 
S Is Whistle-Blowing the Same as Informing?, supra note 3, at 10; Andrews, supra note 5, 
at 11. 
9 Is Whistle-Blowing the Same as Informing?, supra note 3, at 5-6. 
10 See Andrews, supra note 5, at 11-12. 
1l Id. 
12 See, e.g., Boyle v. Vista Eyewear, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 859, 861, 878 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) 
(recognizing a wrongful discharge cause of action for an employee who was discharged for 
reporting employer violations of federal law); see also infra notes 35-43 and accompanying 
text. 
13 See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1421-28 (Purdon Supp. 1988); see also infra notes 
60-61 and accompanying text. 
14 See generally Kohn & Kohn, An Overview of Federal and State Whistle blower Protections, 
4 ANTIOCH L.J. 99, 100-07, app. at 114-52 (1986). 
15 42 U.S.C. § 5851 (1988). 
16 See id. § 5851(aHb). The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has promulgated 
regulations pursuant to section 210. See 10 C.F.R. § 30.7 (1988). These regulations protect 
such activities as providing the NRC with information about possible violations of nuclear 
regulations and testifying in any NRC proceeding. See id. § 30.7(a). 
17 See 42 U.S.C. § 5851(b). 
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available in addition to section 210. Several nuclear whistleblowers, 
instead of pursuing the section 210 remedy, have brought state court 
actions seeking job reinstatement. 18 Courts have split evenly on the 
issue of whether nuclear whistle blowers can bring state court ac-
tions. 19 These courts have disagreed on the issues of whether section 
210 preempts state court jurisdiction20 and whether Congress in-
tended section 210 to be the exclusive remedy for nuclear whistle-
blowers.21 
This Comment examines the remedies available to nuclear whis-
tleblowers whose employers discriminate against them in retaliation 
for their whistleblowing. Section III analyzes nuclear whistle blower 
case law and determines whether section 210 preempts state whis-
tleblower remedies. Next, this Comment explores other environ-
mental statutes that contain whistle blower provisions upon which 
Congress modeled section 210. Examining how courts have con-
strued these provisions reveals several bases for allowing state court 
actions in addition to the federal statutory remedies. Finally, section 
IV's objective is to predict the potential effect that the proposed 
Uniform Health and Safety Whistleblowers Protection Act22 will 
have on these issues if the bill becomes law. 
This Comment concludes that courts should not apply the preemp-
tion doctrine in the area of nuclear whistle blower protection. In 
enacting section 210, Congress clearly declared a policy that nuclear 
whistleblowing should be protected, not punished. When a court 
18 See infra notes 114-35 and accompanying text. 
19 Four courts have allowed nuclear whistleblowers to bring state court wrongful discharge 
actions. See Norris v. Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co., 881 F.2d 1144, 1151 (1st Cir. 1989); 
Gaballah v. PG & E, 711 F. Supp. 988, 991 (N.D. Cal. 1989); Stokes v. Bechtel N. Am. Power 
Corp., 614 F. Supp. 732, 744-45 (N.D. Cal. 1985); Wheeler v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 108 Ill. 
2d 502, 509, 485 N.E.2d 372, 376 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1122 (1986). In four other 
cases, courts held that section 210 precludes nuclear whistle blowers from bringing state court 
actions. See Norman v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 873 F.2d 634, 637 (2d Cir. 1989); 
English v. General Elec., 683 F. Supp. 1006, 1013-15 (E.D.N.C. 1988), aff'd per curiam, 871 
F.2d 22 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. granted, 58 U.S.L.W. 3467 (U.S. Jan. 22, 1990); Snow v. Bechtel 
Constr. Inc., 647 F. Supp. 1514, 1517-19 (C.D. Cal. 1986); Chrisman v. Philips Indus., 751 
P.2d 140, 145 (Kan. 1988). 
20 Compare Wheeler, 108 Ill. 2d at 509,485 N.E.2d at 376 (in enacting section 210, Congress 
did not intend to preempt the field of nuclear whistle blower protection) with English, 683 F. 
Supp. at 1015 (finding that section 210 preempts state law wrongful discharge actions). See 
generally infra notes 112-89 and accompanying text. 
21 Compare Stokes, 614 F. Supp. at 744 (by enacting section 210, Congress intended to 
provide a remedy, not the remedy, for nuclear whistleblowers) with Norman, 873 F.2d at 637 
(the administrative remedy provided in section 210 is exclusive). See generally infra notes 
190-209 and accompanying text. 
22 S. 2095, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); H.R. 4305, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988). 
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finds that section 210 is an exclusive remedy, it does not advance, 
but rather obstructs, this congressional policy. 
II. STATE AND FEDERAL PROTECTION FOR WHISTLE BLOWERS 
A. State Common-Law Protection 
Some states provide discharged whistle blowers with a common-
law cause of action. 23 Many states, however, do not provide remedies 
for whistleblowers.24 Whether a whistle blower has a remedy in any 
given jurisdiction will depend on that jurisdiction's law of wrongful 
discharge. 
1. The Employment-at-Will Doctrine and the Public Policy 
Exception 
Traditionally, at common law, courts have enforced the "employ-
ment-at-will" doctrine. 25 Under this rule, employers are free to dis-
charge noncontractual employees for good cause, bad cause, or no 
cause at all. 26 Likewise, an at-will employee can terminate the em-
ployment relationship at any time. 27 In recent years, however, most 
jurisdictions have modified the employment-at-will rule by judicial 
decision28 or by statute. 29 
The most common modification of the employment-at-will rule is 
the public policy exception. Most states have adopted some form of 
23 See, e.g., Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Oxford, 294 Ark. 239, 249, 250, 743 S.W.2d 380,385,386 
(1988) (employee discharged in retaliation for reporting employer's violations of federal reg-
ulations has a cause of action for wrongful discharge); see also infra notes 35-42 and accom-
panying text. 
24 See, e.g., Campbell v. Eli Lilly & Co., 413 N.E.2d 1054, 1059-61 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) 
(employee discharged in retaliation for reporting employer's violations of federal regulations 
does not have a cause of action); see also infra notes 33, 38. 
25 See, e.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1915) (employer's right to terminate 
employees at will is grounded in the United States Constitution). The employment-at-will 
doctrine is also known as the "terminable-at-will" rule, see, e.g., Bierley v. American Cast 
Iron Pipe Co., 374 So. 2d 1341, 1343 (Ala. 1979), and the "fire-at-will" rule. See, e.g., Patton 
v. J.C. Penney, 301 Or. 117, 122, 719 P.2d 854,857 (1986). 
26 Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise 
of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1405 (1967) (quoting Payne v. Western & At!. 
R.R., 82 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884». 
27 See, e.g., Schriner v. Meginnis Ford Co., 228 Neb. 85, 87-88, 421 N.W.2d 755,757 (1988). 
28 See infra notes 35-43 and accompanying text. 
29 See infra notes 60-61 and accompanying text. 
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the public policy exception. 30 The public policy exception provides 
that an employer cannot discharge an at-will employee if the dis-
charge contravenes public policy.31 If the discharge is contrary to 
public policy, the discharged employee has a cause of action for 
wrongful discharge. 32 
Some states have not adopted any form of public policy exception 
and continue to adhere to the employment-at-will rule. 33 In these 
states, then, whistleblowers have no remedies under state law. Even 
30 California was the first state to provide a discharged employee with a cause of action 
where the discharge contravened public policy. See Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teams-
ters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 189-90, 344 P.2d 25, 27-28 (1959) (employee who was discharged 
for refusing employer's orders to commit perjury has a cause of action). See generally Mauk, 
Wrongful Discharge: The Erosion of 100 Years of Employer Privilege, 21 IDAHO L. REV. 201 
(1985); Note, Protecting Employees at Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public Policy 
Exception, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1931 (1983); Annotation, Modern Status of Rule that Employer 
May Discharge At-Will Employee for Any Reason, 12 A.L.R. 4TH 544 (1982 & Supp. 1988). 
31 See, e.g., Parnar v. Americana Hotels, 65 Haw. 370, 380, 652 P.2d 625, 631 (1982). See 
generally Murg & Scharman, Employment at Will: Do the Exceptions Overwhelm the Rule?, 
23 B.C.L. REV. 329 (1982). 
32 See, e.g., Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Oxford, 294 Ark. 239, 249, 743 S.W.2d 380, 385 (1988); 
Mau v. Omaha Nat'l Bank, 207 Neb. 308, 316, 299 N.W.2d 147,151 (1980). Instead of "wrongful 
discharge," some courts use other terms, such as "retaliatory discharge," see, e.g., Hansen v. 
Harrah's, 100 Nev. 60, 64, 675 P.2d 394,396 (1984), and "abusive discharge." See, e.g., Salazar 
v. Furr's, Inc., 629 F. Supp. 1403, 1408 (D.N.M. 1986). 
33 Five jurisdictions have not adopted any public policy exception. See Hoffman-La Roche, 
Inc. v. Campbell, 512 So. 2d 725, 728 (Ala. 1987) (Alabama Supreme Court has "repeatedly 
refused" to modify the employment-at-will rule); Hinrichs v. Tranquilaire Hosp., 352 So. 2d 
1130, 1131 (Ala. 1977) (no wrongful discharge cause of action for employee who was terminated 
for refusing to falsify employer's documents); Hartley v. Ocean Reef Club; 476 So. 2d 1327, 
1330 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (any public policy exception should be created by the legisla-
ture, not the courts); Phung v. Waste Management, Inc., 23 Ohio St. 3d 100, 103,491 N.E.2d 
1114, 1117 (1986) (court refused to recognize a wrongful discharge cause of action where an 
employee was discharged in retaliation for reporting to his superiors that the company was 
conducting its business in violation of law); Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co., 19 Ohio St. 3d 100, 
103, 483 N.E.2d 150, 153 (1985) (at-will employment is terminable for "any reason which is 
not contrary to law"); Rose v. Allied Dev. Co., 719 P.2d 83,84-85 (Utah 1986) (employment 
contract of indefinite duration may be terminated at will by either party without cause); Volino 
v. General Dynamics, 539 A.2d 531, 532 (R.I. 1988) (no exception to the employment-at-will 
doctrine for an employee who alleged that he was discharged for reporting employer's mal-
practice); but see Cummins v. EG & G Sealol, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 134, 136--37 (D.R.I. 1988) 
(concluding that the Volino court implicitly recognized a whistleblower cause of action). Three 
of these states, however, have enacted statutes that prohibit retaliation against public-sector 
whistleblowers. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 112.3187 (West Supp. 1989); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-
15-3 (Supp. 1988); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 67-21-1 to -9 (1986). 
Georgia enforces the employment-at-will doctrine by statute. See GA. CODE ANN. § 34-7-1 
(1988); see also Mr. B's Oil Co. v. Register, 181 Ga. App. 166, 167, 351 S.E.2d 533, 534 (1986) 
(an employer is free to discharge an at-will employee regardless of the motives involved); 
Taylor v. Foremost-McKesson, Inc., 656 F.2d 1029, 1031--32 (5th Cir. Unit B Sept. 1981) 
(employee who alleged that he was discharged for investigating possibly criminal company 
activities has no cause of action under Georgia law). 
410 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 17:405 
among states that have adopted the public policy exception, the 
scope of protected activity varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 34 
Thus, even in a jurisdiction that has adopted the public policy ex-
ception, the availability of a cause of action for nuclear whistleblow-
ers depends upon whether the jurisdiction's public policy exception 
is broad enough to protect whistleblowers. 
Several states have expressly held that whistleblowers have a 
cause of action for wrongful discharge. 35 Some of these states only 
34 See infra notes 35-43 and accompanying text. 
35 See Wagner v. City of Globe, 150 Ariz. 82, 89-90, 722 P.2d 250, 257-58 (1986) (a whistle-
blower has a cause of action if the whistleblowing exposes "illegal or unsafe practices" and 
"serves a public purpose" rather than merely advancing the whistleblower's own private 
interests); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Oxford, 294 Ark. 239, 249, 250, 743 S.W.2d 380, 385, 386 
(1988) (public policy exception protects employees who are discharged for reporting violations 
of state or federal law); Wheeler v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 108 Ill. 2d 502, 511, 485 N.E.2d 
372, 377 (1985) (nuclear employee discharged for refusing to work with equipment that plaintiff 
alleged did not comply with nuclear regulations sufficiently stated a cause of action for wrongful 
discharge), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1122 (1986); Boyle v. Vista Eyewear, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 859, 
878 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (allowing a cause of action for an employee who was discharged for 
refusing to violate the law and for threatening to report employer's violations of Food and 
Drug Administration regulations); Fielder v. Southco, Inc. of South Carolina, 699 F. Supp. 
577, 577-78 (W.D. Va. 1988) (Virginia's public policy exception held to provide a cause of 
action for an employee who alleged that he was discharged in retaliation for reporting employer 
misconduct, where the public policy was provided by Title VII's prohibition of retaliatory 
discrimination against employees who oppose unlawful employment practices); Cagle v. Burns 
and Roe, Inc., 106 Wash. 2d 911, 913, 726 P.2d 434, 435 (1986) (allowing a cause of action 
where employee was discharged for threatening to report to the NRC that defendant employer 
ordered her to violate NRC regulations). See generally Malin, Protecting the Whistle blower 
from Retaliatory Discharge, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 277, 278-88 (1983); Mauk, supra note 30, 
at 239-45; Note, State Law Protection of At-Will Employees Who "Blow the Whistle," 65 U. 
DET. L. REV. 551, 560-63 (1988); Note, Remedies for Employees Discharged for Reporting 
an Employer's Violation of Federal Law, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1383 (1985). But see 
Marshall & Wicker, The Status of the At-Will Employment Doctrine in Virginia After Bowman 
v. State Bank of Keysville, 20 U. RICH. L. REV. 267 (1986) (arguing that Virginia's public 
policy exception does not protect whistleblowers). Arizona, Illinois, and Washington have also 
enacted statutory protections for public-sector whistleblowers. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 38-532 (1985); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, ~ 63b119c.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988); WASH. REV. 
CODE ANN. §§ 42.40.010-.900 (Supp. 1989). 
The Tennessee Supreme Court has expressed a willingness to recognize a whistle blower 
cause of action under the appropriate circumstances. See Chism v. Mid-South Milling Co., 762 
S. W.2d 552, 557 (Tenn. 1988). In dismissing the complaint, the court indicated that it "might 
be persuaded" to recognize a cause of action where an employee is discharged in retaliation 
for refusing to remain silent about his employer's violations of federal law if such an employee 
"properly raise[sl the issue." [d. at 555. A Tennessee statute protects public-sector employee 
whistleblowers. See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 8-50-601 to -604 (1988). 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has assumed, without deciding, that whistle-
blowers have a cause of action under the public policy exception. See Mello v. Stop & Shop, 
402 Mass. 555, 560 n.6, 524 N.E.2d 105, 108 n.6 (1988). The First Circuit Court of Appeals 
has suggested that Massachusetts would provide a cause of action for discharged nuclear 
whistleblowers. See Norris v. Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co., 881 F.2d 1144, 1153 (1st Cir. 
1990] NUCLEAR WHISTLEBLOWERS 411 
protect whistle blowers who report violations of state law. 36 One 
jurisdiction, while recognizing that whistle blowers deserve protec-
tion, has nevertheless held that a discharged employee has no cause 
of action if there is any other remedy available. 37 Several states have 
1989). The New Mexico Supreme Court has likewise deferred decision on whether whistle-
blowing is protected by the public policy exception. See Sanchez v. The New Mexican, 106 
N.M. 76, 79, 738 P.2d 1321, 1324 (1987). New Mexico courts, however, do not provide a 
wrongful discharge cause of action where a discharged employee has another remedy. Salazar 
v. Furr's, Inc., 629 F. Supp. 1403, 1409 (D.N.M. 1986). 
The District of Columbia continues to adhere to the employment-at-will doctrine. See, e.g., 
Hall v. Ford, 856 F.2d 255, 267 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (District of Columbia "does not currently 
recognize" a public policy exception). The United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia has, however, held that D.C. courts would recognize a cause of action where the 
discharge of an employee violates a statutorily expressed public policy. See Adler v. Columbia 
Historical Soc'y, 690 F. Supp. 9, 16-17 (D.D.C. 1988); Newman v. Legal Serv. Corp., 628 F. 
Supp. 535, 539 (D.D.C. 1986). 
The Wyoming Supreme Court has assumed that, given the appropriate circumstances, they 
might recognize a tort action for discharge in contravention of public policy. See Allen v. 
Safeway Stores, 699 P.2d 277, 284 (Wyo. 1985). The court has cautioned, however, that if 
another remedy exists, there is no need for a court-imposed tort action. Id. 
36 West Virginia adopted a whistleblower cause of action in Harless v. First National Bank, 
162 W. Va. 116, 124,246 S.E.2d 270,275 (1978). Although the plaintiff in Harless alleged that 
he informed his superiors that the defendant bank violated both state and federal law, the 
court based its ruling on the defendant's state law violations. Id. at 117, 125-26,246 S.E.2d 
at 272, 275-76. 
Alaska has declined to decide whether to accept or reject a public policy exception. See 
Arco Alaska v. Akers, 753 P.2d 1150, 1153 (Alaska 1988). Alaska, however, imposes an implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in all at-will employment arrangements. Mitford v. de 
Lasala, 666 P.2d 1000, 1007 (Alaska 1983). The public policy exception is encompassed within 
this implied covenant. Knight v. American Guard & Alert, Inc., 714 P.2d 788, 792 (Alaska 
1986). The Alaska Supreme Court has found that the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing provides a cause of action for a discharged whistleblower. Id. at 792. The plaintiff in 
Knight alleged that the defendant employer discharged him for reporting his coworkers' abuse 
of alcohol and drugs on the job. Id. at 790. 
The Nebraska Supreme Court has found that a whistle blower has a wrongful discharge 
cause of action. Schriner v. Meginnis Ford Co., 228 Neb. 85, 91, 421 N.W.2d 755,759 (1988). 
The court, however, held that a whistleblower has a cause of action only if he or she was 
discharged for reporting violations of state criminal law. Id. at 92,421 N.W.2d at 759. 
37 See Walsh v. Consolidated Freightways, 278 Or. 347, 351-53, 563 P.2d 1205, 1208-09 
(1977) ("[EJmployers should not be allowed to discharge employees solely for complaining 
about safety problems," but discharged employee had no tort remedy because existing rem-
edies under OSHA were adequate to protect the interests of society and employees); see also 
Corbin v. Sinclair Mktg., 684 P.2d 265,267 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984) (the public policy exception 
in Colorado does not extend to a discharged employee who has a statutory remedy); Grzyb v. 
Evans, 700 S.W.2d 399, 401 (Ky. 1985) (where a statute prohibits an act and specifies the 
available remedy, the aggrieved party is limited to the remedy provided by the statute); 
Salazar v. Furr's, Inc., 629 F. Supp. 1403, 1409 (D.N.M. 1986) (no wrongful discharge cause 
of action is available where the law provides a discharged employee with another remedy); 
Allen v. Safeway Stores, 699 P.2d 277, 284 (Wyo. 1985) (if another remedy exists, there is no 
need for a court-imposed tort action). Washington courts have not decided whether a wrongful 
discharge cause of action exists where the declaration of public policy is expressed in a statute 
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expressly rejected the whistleblower exception to the employment-
at-will rule. 38 
Similar to the whistleblower's situation is that of an employee who 
is discharged for disobeying his or her employer's instructions to 
commit an unlawful act. Several jurisdictions recognize that such an 
employee has a wrongful discharge cause of action. 39 In most of these 
already providing a remedy. See Grimwood v. University of Puget Sound, 110 Wash. 2d 355, 
367,753 P.2d 517, 523 (1988). 
These rules regarding exclusivity of remedies are based not on preemption, but on inde-
pendent state grounds. Each state has taken the position that the terminable-at-will rule 
should not be altered unless the discharged employee has no other recourse except the courts. 
See, e.g., Salazar, 629 F. Supp. at 1409 (wrongful discharge tort remedy is unnecessary if a 
discharged whistle blower has the protection of another cause of action). 
38 See Campbell v. Eli Lilly & Co., 413 N.E.2d 1054,1059-61 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (employee 
discharged in retaliation for reporting employer's violations of Food and Drug Administration 
regulations does not have a cause of action for wrongful discharge); Buethe v. Britt Airlines, 
787 F.2d 1194, 1197 (7th Cir. 1986) (the Indiana tort of wrongful termination does not protect 
whistle blowing); Chrisman v. Philips Indus., 751 P.2d 140, 145 (Kan. 1988) (rejecting nuclear 
whistle blower's wrongful discharge action); English v. General Elec., 683 F. Supp. 1006, 1016 
(E.D.N.C. 1988) (nuclear whistleblower does not have a cause of action under North Carolina 
law), afi'd per curiam, 871 F.2d 22 (4th Cir. 1989); Bushko v. Miller Brewing Co., 134 Wis. 
2d 136, 146-47, 396 N.W.2d 167, 172 (1986) (court refused to recognize a whistleblower 
exception on the grounds that whistle blowing is "merely praiseworthy" and is not protected 
under Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 573-74, 335 N. W.2d 834, 840 (1983)). 
Indiana, Kansas, and Wisconsin have nevertheless enacted statutes protecting public-sector 
whistleblowers. See IND. CODE ANN. § 4-15-10-4 (Burns 1986 & Supp. 1988); KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 75-2973 (1984); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 230.80-.89 (West 1987). 
39 See Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 189-90, 344 
P.2d 25, 27-28 (1959) (recognizing a wrongful discharge cause of action where employer 
discharged employee for refusing to commit perjury); McClanahan v. Remington Freight 
Lines, Inc., 517 N.E.2d 390, 393 & n.1 (Ind. 1988) (although Indiana law does not protect 
whistleblowers, an employee who was discharged for refusing to commit an illegal act for 
which he could have been personally liable stated a cause of action); Trombetta v. Detroit, 
Toledo & Ironton R.R., 81 Mich. App. 489, 496, 265 N.W.2d 385, 388 (1978) (employee who 
was discharged for refusing to falsify pollution reports has a wrongful discharge cause of 
action); Boyle v. Vista Eyewear, Inc., 700 S. W.2d 859, 878 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (an employee 
discharged for refusing to violate federal law has a wrongful discharge cause of action); Burk 
v. K-Mart Corp., 770 P.2d 24, 28-29 (Okla. 1989) (recognizing a cause of action where an 
employee is discharged for refusing to act in violation of an established and well-defined public 
policy or for performing an act consistent with a clear and compelling public policy); Watson 
v. Cleveland Chair Co., No. 113, slip op. (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 27, 1987) (employee discharged 
for refusing to violate state and federal law has a cause of action regardless of the existence 
of a federal remedy); Cagle v. Burns and Roe, Inc., 106 Wash. 2d 911,913,726 P.2d 434,435 
(1986) (allowing a cause of action for a discharged employee who refused employer's orders to 
violate federal nuclear regulations). 
The Colorado Court of Appeals has assumed, without deciding, that an employer cannot 
discharge an employee in retaliation for the employee's refusal to violate federal law. See 
Farmer v. Central Bancorporation, 761 P.2d 220, 221 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988). Colorado courts, 
however, do not extend the public policy exception to a plaintiff who has a statutory remedy. 
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states, however, a discharged employee has a cause of action only if 
he or she has refused to violate state law40 or criminal law. 41 
In addition, many states provide a cause of action for 
discharged employees when the discharge was in violation of the 
law. Some of these jurisdictions grant discharged employees a 
cause of action when the discharge violates federal law. 42 Most, 
Corbin v. Sinclair Mktg., 684 P.2d 265, 267 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984). Colorado has enacted a 
statute that protects public-sector whistleblowers. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-50.5-101 to -
107 (1988). 
40 See Hobson v. McLean Hosp. Corp., 402 Mass. 413, 416, 522 N.E.2d 975, 977 (1988) 
(plaintiff stated a claim for wrongful discharge by alleging that she was fired in retaliation for 
refusing to violate state and municipal laws and regulations); Ludwick v. This Minute of 
Carolina, Inc., 287 S.C. 219, 225, 337 S.E.2d 213,216 (1985) (employee discharged for refusing 
employer's order to disobey a subpoena has a cause of action); Bushko v. Miller Brewing Co., 
134 Wis. 2d 136,146,396 N.W.2d 167,172 (1986) (public policy exception limited to employees 
who have been discharged for refusing to violate state statutory or constitutional law). South 
Carolina and Wisconsin, however, provide protection for public-sector employees who report 
their employers' violations of state or federal law. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 8-27-10 to -50 (Law. 
Co-op. Supp. 1988); Wrs. STAT. ANN. §§ 230.80-.89 (West 1987). 
South Dakota has recognized a cause of action where an employee is discharged in retaliation 
for refusing to commit a criminal or unlawful act, but thus far has only applied this public 
policy exception where the employee has refused to violate state law. See Johnson v. Kreiser's, 
Inc., 433 N.W.2d 225,227 (S.D. 1988). 
41 Laws v. Aetna Fin. Co., 667 F. Supp. 342, 348-49 (N.D. Miss. 1987) (recognizing a 
wrongful discharge cause of action for an employee who refused to violate state and federal 
law where his failure to do so would have subjected him to criminal liability); Sabine Pilot 
Servo V. Hauck, 687 S. W.2d 733, 735 (Tex. 1985) (a discharged employee has a cause of action 
only if the sole reason for the discharge was the employee's refusal to violate a state or federal 
law that carries a criminal penalty). In Texas, however, public-sector whistleblowers are 
protected. See TEX. REV. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-16a (Vernon Supp. 1989). 
42 See Parnar V. Americana Hotels, 65 Haw. 370, 380, 652 P.2d 625, 631 (1982) (employee 
discharged in violation of federal antitrust law, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988), has a wrongful discharge 
cause of action); Cloutier V. Great At!. & Pac. Tea Co., 121 N.H. 915, 923, 436 A.2d 1140, 
1144-45 (1981) (Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), 29 U.S.C. § 654(a) (1988), 
provides the necessary public policy to support a wrongful termination claim); Staggie V. Idaho 
Falls Conso!. Hospitals, 110 Idaho 349, 352, 715 P.2d 1019, 1022 (Ct. App. 1986) (adopting 
New Hampshire's public policy exception, requiring plaintiff to demonstratt! that he or she 
was discharged for performing an act that public policy would encourage, or for refusing to 
do something that public policy would condemn); Burk V. K-Mart Corp., 770 P.2d 24, 28-29 
(Okla. 1989) (recognizing a cause of action where a discharge is contrary to a clear mandate 
of public policy as articulated by constitutional, statutory, or decisional law); see also Aubry, 
Employers and Employees: A Call/or Oklahoma's Adoption o/the Whistle-Blower Exception 
to the Employment-at-Will Doctrine, 40 OKLA. L. REV. 285 (1987). An Oklahoma statute 
protects public-sector whistleblowers from retaliatory discrimination. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 74, § 841. 7 (West 1987). 
In Kentucky, there is no specific requirement that the public policy be based on state law. 
See Brown V. Physicians Mut. Ins. Co., 679 S.W.2d 836,838 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984) (recognizing 
a cause of action where employment is terminated in violation of "a legislature's" express or 
implied expression of public policy). Kentucky courts, however, adhere to an exclusive-remedy 
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however, require discharged employees to show that they were 
discharged in violation of state law. 43 
2. Which Jurisdictions Provide Whistleblowers with a Cause of 
Action? 
A nuclear whistle blower would have a remedy in most of the 
jurisdictions that have included whistle blowing within the public 
policy exception. Because nuclear regulatory laws are exclusively 
federal,44 an employee discharged for reporting nuclear violations 
would not have a cause of action in those jurisdictions that protect 
only employees who report violations of state law. Because a federal 
remedy is available to nuclear whistle blowers , 45 they would not have 
a cause of action in those jurisdictions that employ exclusive-remedy 
rule. Where a statute prohibits an act and specifies the available remedy, the aggrieved party 
is limited to the remedy provided by the statute. Grzyb v. Evans, 700 S. W.2d 399, 401 (Ky. 
1985). Kentucky provides protection for public-sector whistleblowers. See Ky. REV. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 61.101-.103 (Michie 1986). 
A federal district court has held that federal law can provide the basis for Maryland public 
policy. See Adler v. American Standard Corp., 538 F. Supp. 572, 578, 579 (D. Md. 1982), 
rev'd, 830 F.2d 1303 (4th Cir. 1987). The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals' reversal of Adler, 
however, places this portion of the district court's decision in serious doubt. See Adler, 830 
F.2d at 1307. Maryland provides statutory protection for public-sector whistleblowers. See 
MD. ANN. CODE art. 64A, §§ 12G-12J (1988). 
43 Three states have expressly limited the public policy exception to cases where the 
discharge contravenes state law. See Anco Constr. Co. v. Freeman, 236 Kan. 626, 629, 693 
P.2d 1183, 1186 (1985) (public policy exception in Kansas is "narrowly drawn," applying only 
to interests protected by state law); Wiltsie v. Baby Grand Corp., 774 P.2d 432, 433 (Nev. 
1989) (because plaintiff reported his employer's state law violations to his supervisor rather 
than to the appropriate authorities, the plaintiff was "merely acting in a private or proprietary 
manner," and the discharge did not violate "an established public policy of this state"); Coman 
v. Thomas Mfg. Co., 371 S.E.2d 731, 735 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988) (wrongful discharge cause of 
action exists in North Carolina only where the state legislature specifically gives an employee 
a right to sue an employer for retaliatory discharge). Kansas and North Carolina, moreover, 
have rejected the proposition that nuclear whistle blowers have a wrongful discharge cause of 
action under the public policy exception. See Chrisman v. Philips Indus., 751 P.2d 140, 145 
(Kan. 1988); English v. General Elec., 683 F. Supp. 1006, 1015 (E.D.N.C. 1988), aff'd per 
curiam, 871 F.2d 22 (4th Cir. 1989). Kansas, however, provides statutory protection for public-
sector whistleblowers. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-2973 (1984). 
Three jurisdictions have allowed a cause of action where a discharge violates state law, but 
have not yet decided whether an employee whose discharge violates federal law has a cause 
of action. See Heller v. Dover Warehouse Mkt., 515 A.2d 178, 181 (Del. Super. Ct. 1986); 
Springer v. Weeks and Leo Co., 429 N.W.2d 558, 560 (Iowa 1988); Krein v. Marian Manor 
Nursing Home, 415 N.W.2d 793,794-95 (N.D. 1987). All three of these states provide public-
sector whistleblowers with statutory protection. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 5115 (1983); 
IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 79.28-.29 (West Supp. 1988); N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-11.1-04 (Supp. 1985 
& Supp. 1987). 
44 See infra notes 101-03 and accompanying text. 
45 See 42 U.S.C. § 5851 (1988); see also infra notes 77-96 and accompanying text. 
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rules. 46 The states that have expressly refused to adopt a whistle-
blower exception to the employment-at-will doctrine would deny 
relief to a nuclear whistle blower unless there is a change in the 
common law of any of these jurisdictions. 
An employee who has been discharged for refusing to violate 
nuclear laws or regulations would have a cause of action in a juris-
diction that protects employees who refuse to violate federal law. 47 
In some jurisdictions, discharged employees would have to show 
that, had they followed their employers' orders to violate nuclear 
regulatory law, the employees would have been subject to criminal 
liability. 48 
Because federal law prohibits the discharge of nuclear whistle-
blowers,49 such whistle blowers would have a remedy in jurisdictions 
that protect employees whose discharge violates federal law. They 
would not have a cause of action, however, in a jurisdiction that 
prohibits only discharge in violation of state law, unless such a 
jurisdiction expanded its public policy exception to prohibit discharge 
in violation of federal law as well. 
The jurisdictions that provide a wrongful discharge cause of action 
typically require the employee to suffer discharge, not merely re-
taliatory discrimination, in order to establish a cause of action. 50 
Thus, nuclear whistle blowers whose employers discriminate against 
them, but do not fire them, would not have a wrongful discharge 
cause of action in these jurisdictions. Some jurisdictions have thus 
far only protected whistle blowers who reported their employers' 
wrongdoing to public authorities. 51 Others, however, have provided 
46 See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
47 See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text. 
48 See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
49 See 42 U.S.C. § 5851(a); see also 10 C.F.R. § 30.7(1988). 
50 Some states provide a wrongful discharge cause of action where there has been a "con-
structive discharge." See, e.g., Wilson v. Board of County Comm'rs, 703 P.2d 1257, 1259 
(Colo. 1985) (to prove constructive discharge, plaintiff employee must show deliberate action 
on the part of defendant employer that renders the employee's working conditions so intol-
erable that the employee has no other choice but to resign); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Oxford, 
294 Ark. 239, 250, 743 S.W.2d 380, 386 (1988) (constructive discharge exists only when a 
reasonable person would have resigned under the same or similar circumstances); Collins v. 
Baker's Supermkts., 223 Neb. 365, 368, 389 N.W.2d 774, 776-77 (1986) (employee not con-
structively discharged where he retained a job with defendant employer at a "substantial, 
though reduced" wage). 
51 See, e.g., Wagner v. City of Globe, 150 Ariz. 82, 84, 90, 722 P.2d 250, 252, 258 (1986) 
(granting a wrongful discharge cause of action to a police officer who was discharged for 
reporting suspected illegal detention to local magistrate); Sterling Drug, 294 Ark. at 242,249, 
743 S. W.2d at 381, 386 (recognizing a wrvngful discharge cause of action where employee was 
discharged for reporting employer's illegal activity to the General Services Administration); 
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relief to employees who reported wrongdoing to public authorities 
or directly to their employers. 52 
Jurisdictions that provide whistleblowers with a wrongful dis-
charge cause of action typically allow a broad range of damages. 53 
These jurisdictions allow successful whistle blower plaintiffs to obtain 
reinstatement and back pay,54 as well as damages for emotional 
distress55 and loss of professional reputation. 56 Punitive damages are 
also generally available in a wrongful discharge action. 57 
Courts impose the same statute of limitations for a wrongful dis-
charge action as for any other tort action, typically two or three 
years. 58 As in most tort actions, however, a whistle blower who wins 
on a wrongful discharge claim cannot recover attorney's fees. 59 
B. State Whistleblower Protection Statutes 
Many states have enacted statutes that provide remedies for dis-
charged whistleblowers. Twenty states now have statutes that pro-
tect pUblic-sector employees from discharge in retaliation for re-
Wiltsie v. Baby Grand Corp., 774 P.2d 432,433-34 (Nev. 1989) (plaintiff failed to come within 
the public policy exception because he reported illegal activity to his supervisor rather than 
to the appropriate authorities); House v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 232 N.J. Super. 42, 48-49, 556 
A.2d 353, 356 (1989) (New Jersey law does not protect an employee's internal complaints 
where the employee has failed to bring the alleged violation of public policy to the attention 
of a governmental authority). 
52 See Wheeler v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 108 Ill. 2d 502, 509-10, 485 N.E.2d 372, 376 
(1985) (whether plaintiff's whistleblowing activity was protected by public policy did not 
depend on whether plaintiff reported violations to the NRC or to his employer), cert. denied, 
475 U.S. 1122 (1986); Boyle v. Vista Eyewear, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 859,878 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) 
(providing a cause of action when an employee is discharged for reporting misconduct to his 
or her superiors or to public authorities). 
53 See generally Korotkin, Damages in Wrongful Termination Cases, A.B.A. J., May 1989, 
at 84-88. 
54 See, e.g., Redemske v. Village of Romeoville, 85 Ill. App. 3d 286, 295, 406 N.E.2d 602, 
609 (1980). See generally Annotation, Damages Recoverable for Wrongful Discharge of At-
Will Employee, 44 A.L.R. 4TH 1131, 1147-48 (1986). 
55 See, e.g., Cagle v. Burns and Roe, Inc., 106 Wash. 2d 911,913,726 P.2d 434,435 (1986); 
Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 162 W. Va. 116, 126, 246 S.E.2d 270, 276 (1978); see also 
Annotation, supra note 54, at 1152-54. 
56 See, e.g., Wiskotoni v. Michigan Nat'l Bank-West, 716 F.2d 378,390 (6th Cir. 1983); see 
also Annotation, supra note 54, at 1154. 
57 See, e.g., Boyle, 700 S.W.2d at 866; Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 186-87,384 
N.E.2d 353, 359-60 (1978); see also Annotation, supra note 54, at 1155-59. 
58 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.16.130 (1988) (two years); Burton v. Tribble, 189 
Ark. 58, 60, 70 S.W.2d 503, 504 (1934) (three-year statute of limitations applies to all tort 
actions not otherwise limited by law). 
59 Section 210, by contrast, authorizes the Secretary of Labor to award attorney's fees to a 
successful plaintiff. 42 U.S.C. § 5851(b)(2)(B)(ii) (1988). 
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porting their employers' unlawful conduct. 60 Ten states have enacted 
statutes protecting whistle blowers in both the public and the private 
sectors.61 Nearly all state whistle blower statutes protect employees 
who report violations of state and federal laws or regulations. 62 These 
60 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-531 to -532 (1985); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-50.5-101 
to -107 (1988); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 5115 (1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 112.3187 (West 
Supp. 1989); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, ~ 63b119c.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988); IND. CODE ANN. 
§ 4-15-10-4 (Burns 1986 & Supp. 1988); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 79.28-.29 (West Supp. 1988); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-2973 (1984); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 61.101-.103 (Michie 1986); MD. 
ANN. CODE art. 64A, §§ 12G-12J (1988); N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-11.1-04 (Supp. 1985 & Supp. 
1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, §§ 841. 7-.9 (West 1987); OR. REV. STAT. § 240.316(5) (1986); 
R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 36-15-1 to -10 (1988); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 8-27-10 to -50 (Law. Co-op. 
Supp. 1988); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 8-50-601 to -604 (1988); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 
6252-16a (Vernon Supp. 1989); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 67-21-1 to -9 (1986); WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. §§ 42.40.010-.900 (Supp. 1989); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 230.80-.89 (West 1987). 
Three of these states also protect private-sector whistle blowers. See Wagner v. City of 
Globe, 150 Ariz. 82, 89-90, 722 P.2d 250, 257-58 (1986); Wheeler v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 
108 Ill. 2d 502, 510, 485 N.E.2d 372, 377 (1985), cen. denied, 475 U.S. 1122 (1986); Cagle v. 
Burns and Roe, Inc., 106 Wash. 2d 911, 913, 726 P.2d 434, 435 (1986). Another, Tennessee, 
has expressed a willingness to consider recognizing a whistleblower cause of action. See Chism 
v. Mid-South Milling Co., 762 S.W.2d 552,555, 557 (Tenn. 1988); see also supra note 35. 
Others have explicitly refused to provide private-sector whistleblowers with a cause of 
action. See Campbell v. Eli Lilly & Co., 413 N.E.2d 1054, 1061 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980); Chrisman 
v. Philips Indus., 751 P.2d 140, 145 (Kan. 1988); Bushko v. Miller Brewing Co., 134 Wis. 2d 
136,145-46,396 N.W.2d 167,172 (1986); see also supra note 38. 
Several of these states have thus far declined to recognize a cause of action for private-
sector whistleblowers. See Heller v. Dover Warehouse Mkt., 515 A.2d 178, 181 (Del. Super. 
Ct. 1986); Hartley v. Ocean Reef Club, 476 So. 2d 1327, 1330 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); 
Springer v. Weeks and Leo Co., 429 N. W.2d 558, 560 (Iowa 1988); Adler v. American Standard 
Corp., 830 F.2d 1303,1307 (4th Cir. 1987); Krein v. Marian Manor Nursing Home, 415 N.W.2d 
793,794-95 (N.D. 1987); Hinson v. Cameron, 742 P.2d 549,557 (Okla. 191m; Ludwick v. This 
Minute of Carolina, Inc., 287 S.C. 219, 225, 337 S.E.2d 213,216 (1985); Sabine Pilot Servo V. 
Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733,735 (Tex. 1985); Volino V. General Dynamics, 539 A.2d 531,532 (R.I. 
1988); but see Cummins V. EG & G Sealol, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 134, 136--37 (D.R.I. 1988) 
(concluding that the Volino court implicitly recognized a whistleblower cause of action). 
Other states would deny relief to private-sector whistle blowers on the grounds that section 
210 of the Energy Reorganization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5851 (1988), provides a remedy for them. 
See Corbin V. Sinclair Mktg., 684 P.2d 265, 267 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984); Grzyb V. Evans, 700 
S.W.2d 399,401 (Ky. 1985); Walsh v. Consolidated Freightways, 278 Or. 347, 351-52, 563 P.2d 
1205, 1208 (1977); see also supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
61 See CAL. LAB. CODE ANN. § 1102.5 (West Supp. 1989); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 10540-10551 
(West 1980); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51m (West Supp. 1988); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 30:2027 (West 1989) (protecting employees who report environmental violations); ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 831-840 (1988); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.428 (Callaghan 1982 & Supp. 
1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 181.931-.935 (West Supp. 1989); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 
to -914 (1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:19-1 to -8 (West 1988); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740 (McKinney 
1988); N.Y. CIV. SERVo LAW § 75-b (McKinney Supp. 1989); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1421-
28 (Purdon Supp. 1988). See generally Note, supra note 35, at 563-65. 
62 See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102.5(b) (West Supp. 1989); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 10542(b) (West 
1980); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51m(b) (West Supp. 1988); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 30:2027(A) (West 1989); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 833(1)(A) (1988); MICH. STAT. ANN. 
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statutes, then, would provide relief to employees who report their 
employers' violations of federal nuclear regulations. Some of these 
statutes also protect employees who participate in investigations into 
employer misconduct. 63 
Unlike common-law jurisdictions, which protect only discharged 
whistleblowers,64 states with whistleblower statutes provide reme-
§ 17.428(2) (Callaghan 1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.932(1)(a) (West Supp. 1989); MONT. 
CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-903 to -904 (1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-3(a) (West 1988); N. Y. LAB. 
LAW § 740 (McKinney 1988); N.Y. CIV. SERVo LAW § 75-b(2)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1989); PA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1423(a) (Purdon Supp. 1988); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-532(A)(I) 
(1985); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-50.5-102(2) (1988); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 5115(a) (1983); 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 112.3187(5)(a) (West Supp. 1989); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, 
~ 63b119c.l(I)(i)-(ii) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988); IND. CODE ANN. § 4-15-1O-4(a) (Burns 1986); 
IOWA CODE ANN. § 79.28 (West Supp. 1988); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-2973(b)(1) (1984); Ky. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 61.102(1) (Michie 1986); MD. ANN. CODE art. 64A, § 12G(a)(1)(i) (1988); 
N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-11.1-04(1) (Supp. 1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 841.7 (West 
1987); OR. REV. STAT. § 240.316(5) (1986); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-15-3(1) (Supp. 1988); S.C. 
CODE ANN. § 8-27-20 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-50-602 (1988); TEX. 
REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-16a(2) (Vernon Supp. 1989); UTAH CODE ANN. § 67-21-3(1) 
(1986); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.40.030(1) (Supp. 1989); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 230.81(1) 
(West 1987). 
Most of these statutes do not require potential whistleblowers to be certain that their 
employers have committed a violation oflaw. They typically protect whistleblowers who report 
suspected violations. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51m(b) (West Supp. 1988); MICH. 
STAT. ANN. § 17.428(2) (Callaghan 1982); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 5115(a) (1983); FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 112.3187(5) (West Supp. 1989); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 61.102(1) (Michie 1986). 
They also protect whistleblowers who have a good-faith belief, see LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 30:2027(A) (West 1989); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 833(1)(A) (1988); MINN. STAT. 
ANN. § 181.932(2)(a) (West Supp. 1989); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1423 (Purdon Supp. 1988); 
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 61.102(1) (Michie 1986); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-16a(2) 
(Vernon Supp. 1989); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.40.050(1)(a) (Supp. 1989), or a reasonable 
belief that their employers have violated the law, see CAL. LAB. CODE § 1002.5(b) (West 
Supp. 1989); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-3(a) (West 1988); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-532(A) 
(1985); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, ~ 63b119c.1(1) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988); IND. CODE ANN. 
§ 4-15-1O-4(c) (Burns 1986); IOWA CODE ANN. § 79.28(2) (West Supp. 1988); MD. ANN. CODE 
art. 64A, § 12G(a)(I) (1988); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-15-3(1) (Supp. 1988); WIS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 230.80(5) (West 1987), or unless the employee knows the report to be false. See COLO. REV. 
STAT. § 24-50.5-103(1)(a) (1988); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-2973(c)(4)(A) (1984); N.D. CENT. 
CODE § 34-11.1-04(3) (Supp. 1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 67-21-3(1)(c) (1986). 
63 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51m(b) (West Supp. 1988); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 
26, § 833(1)(c) (1988); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.428(2) (Callaghan 1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 181.932(1)(b) (West Supp. 1989); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-3(b) (West 1988); N.Y. LAB. LAW 
§ 740(2)(b) (McKinney 1988); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1423(b) (Purdon Supp. 1988); COLO. 
REV. STAT. § 24-50.5-102(2) (1988); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 112.3187(7) (West Supp. 1989); R.I. 
GEN. LAWS § 36-15-3(2) (Supp. 1988); S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-27-20 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 67-21-3(2) (1986). 
Hawaii prohibits retaliation against an employee who "receives a summons, responds 
thereto, serves as a witness or attends court as a prospective witness." HAW. REV. STAT. 
§ 621-10.5 (1988). Similarly, South Carolina prohibits the discharge of an employee who 
complies with a subpoena or serves on a jury. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-1-70 (Law. Co-op. 
Supp. 1988). 
64 See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
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dies for employees whose employers discriminate against them in 
any way in retaliation for their whistle blowing. 65 Many of these 
statutes, unlike most common-law jurisdictions,66 protect whistle-
blowers who report misconduct directly to their employers or to 
anyone else. 67 In these states, then, a nuclear whistle blower need 
6.0 See CAL. LAB. CODE ANN. § 1102.5(b) (West Supp. 1989); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-
51m(b) (West Supp. 1988); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2027(B)(1) (West 1989); ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 833(1) (1988); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.428(2) (Callaghan 1982); MINN. 
STAT. ANN. § 181.932(1) (West Supp. 1989); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-903 to -904 (1987) 
(prohibiting discharge and "constructive discharge"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-3 (West 1988); 
N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740(2) (McKinney 1988); N.Y. CIV. SERVo LAW § 75-b(2)(a) (McKinney 
Supp. 1989); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1423 (Purdon Supp. 1988); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 38-532(A) (1985); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-50.5-103(1) (1988); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 5115(a) 
(1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 112.3187(4) (West Supp. 1989); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, 
~ 63b119c.1(2) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988); IND. CODE ANN. § 4-15-1O-4(b), 4-15-10-5 (Burns 
1986); IOWA CODE ANN. § 79.28(2) (West Supp. 1988); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-2973(d) (1984); 
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 61.102(1) (Michie 1986); MD. ANN. CODE art. 64A, § 12G(a)(1) (1988); 
N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-11.1-04(2) (Supp. 1985 & Supp. 1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, 
§ 841. 7 (West 1987); OR. REV. STAT. § 240.316(5) (1986); R.l. GEN. LAWS § 36-15-3 (Supp. 
1988); S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-27-30(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988) (protecting employees who 
have suffered retaliation within one year of disclosing employer misconduct); TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 8-50-603(a) (1988); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-16a(2) (Vernon Supp. 1989); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 67-21-3 (1986); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.40.030 (Supp. 1989) (pro-
hibiting retaliatory discrimination within two years of employee whistleblowing); WIS. STAT. 
ANN. § 230.83(1) (West 1987). 
By contrast, most jurisdictions that recognize a wrongful discharge cause of action require 
that the plaintiff employee be discharged before a court will grant relief. See supra note 50 
and accompanying text. 
66 See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text. 
67 Some states protect only employees who report employer misconduct to a governmental 
body. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102.5(b) (West Supp. 1989); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 10543(a) (West 
Supp. 1989) (Joint Legislative Audit Committee or Auditor General); CONN. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 31-51m(b) (West Supp. 1988); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.428(2) (Callaghan 1982); N.Y. 
CIV. SERVo LAW § 75-b(2)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1989); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-532(A) 
(1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 5115(a) (1983) (Office of Auditor of Accounts); FLA. STAT. 
ANN. § 112.3187(6) (West Supp. 1989); IOWA CODE ANN. § 79.29 (West Supp. 1988); Ky. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 61.102(1) (Michie 1986); OR. REV. STAT. § 240.316(5)(a) (1986); R.l. GEN. LAWS 
§ 36-15-3(1) (Supp. 1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-50-602 (1988) (an elected public official); TEX. 
REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-16a(2) (Vernon Supp. 1989); UTAH CODE ANN. § 67-21-4(4) 
(1986); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.40.030 (Supp. 1989) (Office of the State Auditor). 
Other states protect employees who report misconduct to a public body or to their employ-
ers, see ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 833(1) (1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.932(1)(a) 
(West Supp. 1989); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-904 (1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-3(a) (West 
1988); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740(2)(a) (McKinney 1988); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1423(a) (Purdon 
Supp. 1988); N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-11.1-04(1) (Supp. 1987), or to any other person. See LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2027(A) (West 1989); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-50.5-102(2) (1988); ILL. 
REV. STAT. ch. 127, ~ 63b119c.1(1) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988); IND. CODE ANN. § 4-15-1O-4(a) 
(Burns 1986); IOWA CODE ANN. § 79.28(2) (West Supp. 1988); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-2973(b)(1) 
(1984); MD. ANN. CODE art. 64A, § 12G(a)(1) (1988); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 841.7 (West 
1987); S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-27-20 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 230.81(1) 
(West 1987). These statutes protect "internal whistleblowers" who inform their employers of 
illegal or improper conduct. See infra note 87. 
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not report employer misconduct to public authorities in order to 
have a cause of action. In a few states, a would-be nuclear whistle-
blower would have a cause of action even if he or she did not actually 
blow the whistle. These states protect employees who were about 
to report,68 or threatened to report,69 employer misconduct. 
Most state whistle blower protection statutes provide for remedies 
similar to those available in common-law jurisdictions. Most whistle-
blower statutes authorize civil actions. 70 Some of these statutes, 
however, impose ninety-day71 or one-year72 statutes of limitations. 
Most of them authorize all appropriate relief,73 including punitive 
68 See MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.428(2) (Callaghan 1982); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1423(a) 
(Purdon Supp. 1988); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 841. 7 (West 1988) (prohibiting retaliatory 
discrimination against an employee for "providing or offering to provide information" regarding 
employer misconduct); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-15-3 (Supp. 1988); UTAH CODE ANN. § 67-21-
4(4) (1986) (protecting employees who were discharged while "intending to report" employer 
misconduct). 
69 See N.J. STAT ANN. § 34:19-3(a) (West 1988); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740(2)(a) (McKinney 
1988). 
70 See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 10543(c) (West 1980); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2027(B) (West 
1989); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.935(a) (West Supp. 1989); N. Y. CIV. SERVo LAW § 75-b(3)(c) 
(McKinney Supp. 1989); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1424(a) (Purdon Supp. 1988) (imposing a 
180-day statute of limitations); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-50.5-104 to -105 (1988); R.I. GEN. 
LAWS § 36-15-4(a) (Supp. 1988) (three-year statute of limitations); S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-27-
30(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988) (two-year statute of limitations); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-50-
603(b) (1988); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-16a(3)(c) (Vernon Supp. 1989); WASH. 
REV. CODE ANN. § 42.40.050(1)(b) (Supp. 1989). 
Some states provide administrative remedies. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-2973(d) (1984) 
(30-day statute of limitations); MD. ANN. CODE art. 64A, §§ 12H-12I (1988); OKLA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 74, § 841. 7 (West 1987) (30-day statute of limitations); OR. REV. STAT. § 240.316(5)(d) 
(1986); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 230.85 (West 1987) (160-day statute of limitations). 
Two states allow a discharged whistle blower to bring a civil action only after exhausting 
all available administrative remedies. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51m(c) (West Supp. 
1988); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 112.3187(8) (West Supp. 1989). 
Several states require that, before blowing the whistle, employees must bring any suspected 
violations to the attention of their superiors and allow them reasonable time to correct any 
violations. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 833(2) (1988); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-4 (West 
1988); N. Y. LAB. LAW § 740(3) (McKinney 1988); N. Y. CIV. SERVo LAW § 75-b(2)(b) (McKinney 
Supp. 1989); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-50.5-103(2) (1988); IND. CODE ANN. § 4-15-10-4(a) (Burns 
1986); UTAH CODE ANN. § 67-21-3(1)(a) (1986); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.40.060 (Supp. 
1989); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 230.81(1)(a) (West 1987). Kansas and Kentucky, by contrast, 
expressly provide that a public-sector employee is under no duty to inform his or her superiors 
of any wrongdoing before blowing the whistle. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-2973(b)(2) (1984); 
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 61.102(1) (Michie 1986). 
71 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51m(c) (West Supp. 1988); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.428(3) 
(Callaghan 1982); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 5115(b) (1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 112.3187(8) 
(West Supp. 1989); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 61.103(1) (Michie 1986); UTAH CODE ANN. § 67-
21-4(1) (1986). 
72 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-5 (West 1988); N. Y. LAB. LAW § 740(4)(a) (McKinney 1988). 
73 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-50.5-104(2) to -105 (1988). 
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damages,74 and some allow whistle blowers to recover attorney's 
fees. 75 
C. Federal Protection for Nuclear Whistleblowers: Section 210 of 
the Energy Reorganization Act 
In addition to the states, Congress has established statutory pro-
tections for whistle blowers. 76 In 1978, Congress amended the En-
ergy Reorganization Act of 1974,77 adding section 210. 78 Section 210 
protects any person whose employer is licensed by the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC), or has applied for a license, or is a 
contractor or subcontractor of an NRC licensee or applicant. 79 Sec-
tion 210 prohibits any such employer from discharging or otherwise 
discriminating against an employee who has reported nuclear 
violations80 or who has taken part in any action81 to carry out the 
purposes of the Atomic Energy Act82 or the Energy Reorganization 
Act. 83 
Section 210 provides the nuclear whistleblower with an adminis-
trative remedy.84 Any employee who believes that he or she has 
been discharged or discriminated against in violation of section 210 
may file a complaint with the Secretary of Labor. 85 
In order to have a remedy under section 210, a nuclear whistle-
blower need not be discharged. Section 210 protects whistleblowers 
who suffer any kind of retaliation by their employers.86 According 
to the prevailing view, section 210 protects both the "internal whis-
tleblower, "87 who reports misconduct to his or her employer, and 
74 See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-905(2) (1987); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-
16a(4)(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1989). 
75 See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1425 (Purdon Supp. 1988); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 112.3187(9)(d) (West Supp. 1989); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 67-21-4 to -5 (1986). 
76 See supra note 14. 
7742 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5891 (1988). 
78Id. § 5851. 
79Id. § 5851(a). 
80 See 10 C. F. R. § 30.7(a) (1988). 
81 See 42 U.S.C. § 5851(a); see also 10 C.F.R. § 30.7. 
82 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1988). 
83 Id. §§ 5801-5891. 
84 See id. § 5851(b); see also Fidell & Marcoux, The Nuclear Industry Employee Protection 
Provisions of Federal Law, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Nov. 11, 1982, at 15-16. 
85 42 U.S.C. § 5851(b)(I). 
86 See id. § 5851(a). See DeFord v. Secretary of Labor, 700 F.2d 281, 285-87 (6th Cir. 1983), 
for a discussion of the essential elements of a discrimination claim under section 210. 
87 If a whistle blower is discharged for making internal complaints, he or she will not put 
the authorities on notice of his or her employer's safety violations until filing a claim in state 
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employees who report their employers' violations to a public entity. 88 
Section 210 also protects employees who have been discharged when 
they were about to blow the whistle. 89 Like some state whistle blower 
statutes,90 section 210 protects not only employees who on their own 
initiative report employer misconduct, but also prot,ects employees 
who assist or participate in any investigation of their employers. 91 
In contrast to common-law jurisdictions and most state statutes, 92 
section 210 imposes a thirty-day statute of limitations. 93 Like state 
law, section 210 allows an aggrieved whistle blower to be reinstated 
and to recover compensatory damages from the defendant em-
ployer.94 The Secretary of Labor, however, has determined that 
section 210 does not authorize the recovery of damages for medical 
expenses or damages to reputation resulting from a violation of 
section 210. 95 Moreover, a discharged whistle blower in most circum-
stances cannot receive punitive damages under section 210. 96 
III. PREEMPTION AND EXCLUSIVITY 
A. Background: The Preemption Doctrine 
The existence of a federal remedy for nuclear whistle blowers 
raises the issue of whether section 210 preempts state remedies for 
nuclear whistle blowers. Congress may preempt state authority by 
stating its intent to do SO.97 Absent explicit preemptive language, 
court or with the Secretary of Labor. The view of the Secretary of Labor and of most courts 
and commentators is that such "internal whistleblowing" merits section 210 protection. See 
generally Drachsler, Brown & Root v. Donovan: An Exercise in Judicial Myopia, 38 LAB. 
L.J. 311 (May 1987); Kohn & Carpenter, supra note 2; Anglin, Whistleblowers, Nuclear Plant 
Safety, and Job Protection, PUB. UTIL. FORT., April 17, 1986, at 56-57; Annotation, Whis-
tleblowers' Protection Under Energy Reorganization Act § 210 (42 uses § 5851), 79 A.L.R. 
FED. 631, 639-42 (1986). 
88 See 42 U.S.C. § 5851(a). 
89 See id. 
90 See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
91 42 U.S.C. § 5851(a). 
92 See supra notes 58, 71-72 and accompanying text. 
93 42 U.S.C. § 5851(b). 
94 [d. § 5851(b)(2)(B)(ii). 
95 See DeFord v. Secretary of Labor, 700 F.2d 281, 284 (6th Cir. 1983). The Sixth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, however, disagreed with the Secretary's determination, holding that such 
damages are recoverable under section 210. [d. at 288. 
96 A whistle blower can only be awarded punitive damages under section 210 if an employer 
has failed to comply with the Secretary of Labor's order to reinstate the whistle blower. 42 
U.S.C. § 5851(d). 
97 Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation and Dev. Comm'n, 461 
U.S. 190, 203 (1983) (citing Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977)). 
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Congress can preempt state law if it evidences an intent to occupy 
a given field. 98 This intent may be inferred from a scheme of federal 
regulation "so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that 
Congress left no room for the States to supplement it. "99 If Congress 
evidences an intent to occupy a given field, any state law falling 
within that field is preempted. 100 
In Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conser-
vation and Development Commission,lol the United States Supreme 
Court ruled that the federal government occupies the field of nuclear 
safety regulation, thereby preempting state regulation, except the 
limited powers expressly ceded to the states. l02 The federal scheme 
of nuclear safety regulation thus preempts any state attempt to 
regulate nuclear safety. 103 The Pacific Gas & Electric decision, how-
ever, allows states to regulate nuclear power other than for safety 
reasons. 104 
In Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 105 the Supreme Court addressed 
the issue of whether federal law preempts all state attempts at 
nuclear regulation. 106 The Court noted that regulation of an industry 
can be exerted effectively through an award of damages. l07 The 
Court nevertheless held that an Oklahoma court's punitive damages 
award for an employee's radiation injuries did not frustrate Con-
gress's objective of precluding dual regulation of radiation hazards. 108 
The Silkwood Court thus established a new standard for preemp-
tion of state damages awards. 109 Federal law preempts any state law 
98 Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984). 
99 Pacific Gas & Elec., 461 U.S. at 204 (quoting Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De la 
Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982)). 
100 Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 248. 
101 461 U.S. 190 (1983). 
102 Id. at 212. See generally Woychik, California'S Nuclear Disposal Law Confronts the 
Nuclear Waste Management Dilemma: State Power to Regulate Reactors, 14 ENVTL. L. 359, 
383-97 (1984); Note, Preemptio~Atomic Energy, 24 NAT. RES. J. 761 (1984). 
103 See Snow v. Bechtel Constr. Inc., 647 F. Supp. 1514, 1517 (C.D. Cal. 1986). See generally 
Note, Preemption of State Regulation of Nuclear Power, 5 J. ENERGY L. & POL'y 135 (1983). 
104 See, e.g., Casenote, Punitive Damages Award Against Nuclear Power Company Threat-
ens Exclusivity of Federal Control: Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 26 B.C.L. REV. 727, 734 
(1985) (citing Pacific Gas & Elec., 461 U.S. at 207-08). 
105 464 U. S. 238 (1984). 
106 See id. at 248-58. 
107Id. at 249 (citing San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959)); 
see Note, Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.: Regulation Through Punitive Damages, 11 OHIO 
N.U.L. REV. 827 (1984). 
108 Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 257. See generally Casenote, supra note 104; Note, Federal 
Supremacy Versus Legitimate State Interests in Nuclear Regulation: Pacific Gas & Electric 
and Silkwood, 33 CATH. U.L. REV. 899,327-34 (1984). 
109 Note, supra note 108, at 930. 
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that conflicts with it, that is, if it is impossible to comply with both 
state and federal law. llO In the absence of an irreconcilable conflict, 
preemption should be judged on whether a state standard in a dam-
ages action would frustrate the objectives of federallaw. lll 
B. Nuclear Whistle blower Case Law 
Several courts have addressed the issue of whether section 210 
preempts state jurisdiction over nuclear whistle blower suits. Some 
of these courts held that section 210 is preemptive. 1l2 Others, how-
ever, held that nuclear whistle blowers have remedies under state 
law in spite of the availability of the section 210 remedy.1l3 
In Stokes v. Bechtel North American Power COrp.,1l4 the plaintiff, 
an engineer at the defendant's Diablo Canyon nuclear power plant, 
alleged that he refused to suppress information concerning quality 
assurance problems and design miscalculations at Diablo Canyon. 115 
Stokes sued in state court, alleging that Bechtel discharged him in 
retaliation for his refusal to suppress safety violations. 116 The defen-
dant removed the case to the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of California,117 which remanded the case to state 
court, finding that section 210 does not preempt state jurisdiction. lls 
The court concluded that, because section 210 does not preempt, but 
rather supplements, state protections for nuclear whistle blowers , 
the plaintiff was free to bring an action alleging a violation of state 
law. 1l9 
Similarly, in Wheeler v. Caterpillar Tractor CO.,120 the Illinois 
Supreme Court found that section 210 does not preclude state rem-
edies for nuclear whistleblowers.121 In Wheeler, the plaintiff refused 
110 Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 248 (citing Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 
U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963)). 
III Id. at 256; see also id. at 249 (federal law preempts any state law that stands as an 
obstacle to the accomplishment of the "full purposes and objectives of Congress") (citing Hines 
v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941». 
112 See infra notes 128-35 and accompanying text. 
113 See infra notes 114-25 and accompanying text. 
114 614 F. Supp. 732 (N.D. Cal. 1985). 
115 I d. at 735. 
116 Id. 
117 Removal jurisdiction was based on the preemption issue raised by section 210. Id. 
118Id. at 742. 
119 Id. at 744-45; see also Gaballah v. PG & E, 711 F. Supp. 988, 991 (N.D. Cal. 1989) 
(section 210 does not bar a state court action based on state law). 
120 108 Ill. 2d 502, 485 N.E.2d 372 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1122 (1986). 
121Id. at 509-11, 485 N.E.2d at 376-77. 
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to work with the defendant's cobalt x-ray unit on the grounds that 
the defendant's operation of the unit violated NRC regulations. 122 
Wheeler alleged that his discharge was in retaliation for his refusal 
to work with the unsafe equipment and that it was therefore in 
contravention of public policy.123 The court held that Congress, in 
enacting section 210, did not intend to preempt the field of nuclear 
whistle blower protection. 124 The court therefore reversed a lower 
court's dismissal of the plaintiff's wrongful discharge claim. 125 Most 
recently, the First Circuit Court of Appeals in Norris v. Lumber-
men's Mutual Casualty CO.126 held that, because there is no conflict 
between section 210 and state law actions for wrongful discharge, 
section 210 does not preempt such actions. 127 
Other courts, however, have held that section 210 preempts state 
whistleblower remedies and provides the exclusive remedy for nu-
clear whistleblowers. In Snow v. Bechtel Construction Inc.,1'l.8 the 
United States District Court for the Central District of California 
dismissed a nuclear whistle blower's wrongful discharge claim. 129 The 
court found that section 210 is part of the federal scheme of nuclear 
safety regulation and therefore preempts state court jurisdiction 
over nuclear whistleblower claims.130 According to the Snow court, 
Congress intended section 210 to be the exclusive remedy for nuclear 
whistleblowers. 131 
Similarly, in English v. General Electric,132 the plaintiff informed 
her employer and the NRC of safety violations at the defendant's 
nuclear fuel manufacturing plant.133 English alleged that, in retalia-
tion for her reports to the NRC, her employer discriminated against 
her and then fired her. 134 The court dismissed the plaintiff's wrongful 
122 Id. at 504-05, 485 N.E.2d at 374. 
123 Id. at 505, 485 N.E.2d at 374. 
124 Id. at 509, 485 N.E.2d at 376. 
125 Id. at 511, 485 N.E.2d at 376. 
126 881 F.2d 1144 (1st Cir. 1989). 
127 Id. at 1151. 
128 647 F. Supp. 1514 (C.D. Cal. 1986). 
129 I d. at 1519. 
130Id. at 1517; accord Chrisman v. Philips Indus., 751 P.2d 140, 145 (Kan. 1988). 
131 Snow, 647 F. Supp. at 1518; accord Norman v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 873 F.2d 
634, 637 (2d Cir. 1989). 
132 683 F. Supp. 1006 (E.D.N.C. 1988), afl'd per curiam, 871 F.2d 22 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. 
granted, 58 U.S.L.W. 3467 (U.S. Jan. 22, 1990). 
133 I d. at 1008. 
134 I d. at 1009. 
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discharge claim, finding that Congress, in enacting section 210, in-
tended to preempt state protections for nuclear whistleblowers.135 
IV. DOES SECTION 210 PREEMPT STATE WHISTLE BLOWER 
REMEDIES? 
Section 210 does not expressly preempt state protection for nu-
clear whistleblowers. Nowhere in section 210 or anywhere else has 
Congress expressly preempted state authority over nuclear whistle-
blower remedies. 136 The next question, then, is whether whistle-
blower protection constitutes nuclear safety regulation, a field the 
federal government has occupied to the exclusion of the states. 
A. Does Whistleblower Protection Constitute Safety Regulation? 
Because the federal government has completely occupied the field 
of nuclear safety regulation,137 section 210 is preemptive if it is part 
of the federal scheme of nuclear safety regulation. The question, 
then, revolves around the primary purpose behind nuclear whistle-
blower protection. 
Courts have disagreed on whether the purpose of whistle blower 
protection is to regulate nuclear safety or to protect the whistle-
blower's job security. In Snow v. Bechtel Construction Inc.,l38 the 
135 [d. at 1013-15. 
136 Two courts have considered the absence of preemptive language in section 210 to be 
indicative of a lack of congressional intent to preempt state whistle blower remedies. See 
Norris v. Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co., 881 F.2d 1144, 1150 (1st Cir. 1989); Gaballah v. 
PG & E, 711 F. Supp. 988, 989 (N.D. Cal. 1989). 
137 See supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text. The English v. General Electric court 
held that section 210 represents a congressional intent to occupy the field of nuclear whistle-
blower protection. 683 F. Supp. at 1015. The Gaballah v. PG & E court, however, found that 
section 210 "can hardly be regarded as pervasive federal regulation of employer-employee 
relations in the nuclear power industry." 711 F. Supp. at 990. Occupation of a field is not 
normally found absent "persuasive reasons for doing so, that is 'either that the nature of the 
regulated subject matter permits no other conclusion, or that the Congress has unmistakably 
so ordained.'" Casenote, supra note 104, at 727 (quoting Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, 
Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963». Congress has not unmistakably ordained that it has 
occupied the field of nuclear whistle blower protection. The nature of whistleblower protection, 
moreover, is not such that federal occupation is the only permissible conclusion. Many states 
now protect whistleblowers, see supra notes 35-36, 60-61 and accompanying text, and nuclear 
whistleblower protection, unlike nuclear safety, does not present "'technical safety consider-
ations . . . of such complexity that it is not likely that any State would be prepared to deal 
with them.''' Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 250 (1984) (quoting H.R. REP. 
No. 1125, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1959». 
138 647 F. Supp. 1514 (C.D. Cal. 1986). 
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court conceded that preserving a whistleblower's position was an 
"essential corollary" to section 210, but found that this protection 
was secondary to the primary purpose of regulating safety.139 The 
court found that section 210 preempted Snow's state law action to 
the extent that he claimed that his discharge resulted from his 
complaints about safety violations. 14o The court apparently assumed 
that Snow's tort action constituted an attempt to use a state court 
to regulate nuclear safety based upon state law. 141 Because federal 
law precludes the use of state courts for this purpose, the court 
dismissed Snow's complaint for lack of jurisdiction. 142 
In Chrisman v. Philips Industries,143 the Kansas Supreme Court 
likewise found that section 210 is part of the occupied field of nuclear 
safety regulation. 144 The court pointed out that section 210 not only 
provides a remedy for whistleblowers, but also provides the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission with "invaluable information" from nuclear 
industry employees who are most likely to discover safety prob-
lems. 145 Thus, the court found that section 210 is primarily a safety 
regulation, and that, because Congress had preempted the field, the 
plaintiff had no state law claim. 146 
In Stokes v. Bechtel North American Power COrp.,147 the court 
disagreed, finding that the public policy upon which the plaintiff 
based his claim was not the federal interest in nuclear safety, rather 
it was the state policy of protecting job security.148 The court con-
sidered it significant that the plaintiff was not suing to compel de-
fendant's compliance with nuclear regulations. Although Stokes ad-
dressed safety concerns before filing suit, when he refused to 
suppress the defendant's violations,149 his suit involved safety reg-
139 I d. at 1518. 
140 I d. at 1519. 
141 See, e.g., San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 249 (1959) (regulation 
can be "effectively asserted through an award of damages"). 
142 See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text. 
143 751 P.2d 140 (Kan. 1988). 
144Id. at 145. 
145Id. 
146Id. 
147 614 F. Supp. 732 (N.D. Cal. 1985). 
148Id. at 742; cf. Casenote, supra note 104, at 740 (state action may permissibly affect the 
safety of nuclear power if that action has some other legitimate nonsafety-related purpose, 
but may not permissibly regulate safety if the impact on safety is itself the purpose of the 
state action) (citing Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation and Dev. 
Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190,216 (1983». 
149 Stokes, 614 F. Supp. at 735. 
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ulation only peripherally, if at all. 150 The court found that Stokes was 
merely seeking to enforce his right to not be unlawfully fired. 151 
Even the English v. General Electric court, which dismissed a 
whistleblower's claim, conceded that section 210 was not a safety 
regulation. 152 The court found that the plaintiff's complaint con-
cerned nuclear safety to some extent, but that nuclear safety was 
only tangential to the plaintiff's action. 153 Congress did not intend 
section 210 to be a regulator of nuclear safety.l54 Section 21O's leg-
islative history revealed to the English court that employee protec-
tion was the "paramount congressional intent. "155 The prevailing 
view, then, is that the purpose of whistle blower protection is pri-
marily remedial, not regulatory. Section 210, therefore, is not part 
of the federal scheme of nuclear safety regulation. 
B. Do State Whistleblower Remedies Frustrate Section 210's 
Objectives? 
If Stokes and English are correct in holding that section 210 is not 
a nuclear safety regulation, section 210 can nevertheless preempt 
150 [d. at 742; cf. Norris v. Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co., 881 F.2d 1144, 1150 (1st Cir. 
1989) (a nuclear whistle blower's state law action for wrongful discharge "does not affect in 
any way the safety standards promulgated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission"). But see 
Norman v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 873 F.2d 634, 637 (2d Cir. 1989) ("We are not 
dealing here with a collateral matter that is only peripherally related to the safety concerns 
implicit in section 210. "). 
151 Stokes, 614 F. Supp. at 742. 
152 683 F. Supp. 1006, 1012-13 (E.D.N.C. 1988), afl'd per curiam, 871 F.2d 22 (4th Cir. 
1989), cert. granted, 58 U.S.L.W. 3467 (U.S. Jan. 22, 1990). 
153 [d. at 1012. 
154 [d. at 1013; accord Norris, 881 F.2d at 1150 (section 210 is "primarily concerned with 
protecting whistle blowers"). The Silkwood Court based its holding that Congress has occupied 
the field of nuclear safety regulation on the technical complexity involved. See Silkwood v. 
Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 250 (1984) (regulation of nuclear safety presents '''technical 
safety considerations . . . of such complexity that it is not likely that any State would be 
prepared to deal with them during the foreseeable future"') (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1125, 
86th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1959». Because nuclear whistleblower protection does not require 
the same level of technical expertise, the rationale for the federal occupation of the field of 
nuclear safety does not justify occupation of the field of whistle blower protection. 
155 English, 683 F. Supp. at 1013; see S. REP. No. 95-848, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 29, reprinted 
in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 7303. The Senate Report reveals that employee 
protection is section 21O's primary purpose. The Report's initial section announces that section 
210 "offers protection to employees who believe they have been fired or discriminated against" 
in retaliation for their whistleblowing activities. [d. Later, in the summary section, the Report 
reveals Congress's expectation that, under section 210, "employees ... could help assure that 
employers do not violate requirements of the Atomic Energy Act." [d. at 7304. The structure 
of the Report thus suggests that employee protection is section 21O's primary purpose, and 
that more effective nuclear safety regulation was intended to be an additional benefit of section 
210. 
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state court remedies. If it is impossible to comply with both state 
law and section 210, then there is an irreconcilable conflict between 
the two, and section 210 is therefore preemptive. It is not impossible 
to comply with both section 210 and state law,156 so section 210 is 
not preemptive under this test. Section 210 is preemptive, however, 
if state whistleblower remedies obstruct the purposes and objectives 
served by section 210. 
Because of the factual distinctions between Silkwood and the nu-
clear whistleblower situation,157 courts deciding whistle blower cases 
are not bound by the Silkwood ruling that state remedies are not 
156 An employer can comply with both section 210 and state tort law merely by not discharg-
ing or otherwise discriminating against employee whistleblowers. See Gaballah v. PG & E, 
711 F. Supp. 988, 990 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (defendant employer failed to show that the conflict 
between state law and section 210 was "so pronounced that 'compliance with both ... [is] a 
physical impossibility"') (quoting Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conser-
vation and Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 204 (1983». 
157 Several courts have pointed out the distinctions between Silkwood and wrongful discharge 
cases brought by nuclear whistle blowers. A discharged whistleblower's alleged injury is 
retaliatory termination, whereas the claim in Silkwood was personal injury. See Snow v. 
Bechtel Constr. Inc., 647 F. Supp. 1514, 1519 (C.D. Cal. 1986). The Snow court also pointed 
out that the Silkwood Court explicitly restricted its holding to radiation injuries. Id.; see 
Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 256 (Supreme Court limited its preemption analysis to the issue of 
damages for radiation injuries, noting that there could be instances in which federal law would 
preempt the recovery of damages based on state law). 
The English v. General Electric court pointed out that the federal statute implicated in 
Silkwood, the Price-Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1982), unlike section 210, indicated that 
Congress did not intend to preempt state tort remedies for persons injured by nuclear 
accidents. See Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 251-56. Moreover, the Supreme Court in Silkwood found 
the absence of a federal remedy significant, concluding that Congress could not possibly have 
intended to provide persons injured by nuclear accidents with no judicial recourse. Wheeler 
v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 108 Ill. 2d 502,516,485 N.E.2d 372,379 (1985) (Moran and Ryan, 
JJ., dissenting) (citing Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 251), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1122 (1986). Section 
210, by contrast, provides nuclear whistleblowers with a federal remedy. See 42 U.S.C. § 5851 
(1988). 
In Stokes v. Bechtel North American Power Corp., 614 F. Supp. 732, 740-42 (N.D. Cal. 
1985), by contrast, the court relied on Silkwood and held that the federal scheme of nuclear 
safety regulation does not preclude a nuclear whistleblower's state court claim. The court did 
not address the factual distinctions between Silkwood and the nuclear whistle blower's situa-
tion. Instead, the court pointed out that the Supreme Court has acknowledged legitimate 
state concerns in the nuclear energy area. Id. at 741. Because the Supreme Court has not yet 
fully formulated "the ambit of permissible state involvement," the Stokes court chose to 
consider the spirit of the Silkwood decision, rather than limit the Supreme Court's holding to 
its particular facts. Id. The Gaballah v. PG & E court likewise relied on Silkwood, pointing 
out that "[t]here is no apparent reason why Congress should have wanted to bar persons who 
complained about safety violations from a jury trial and the recovery of punitive damages but 
not to bar persons who suffered injuries from those violations." 711 F. Supp. 988, 990 (N.D. 
Cal. 1989); accord Norris v. Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co., 881 F.2d 1144, 1151 (1st Cir. 
1989) ("There is no good reason for barring state remedies to whistle blowers but allowing 
punitive damages under state law to those who are injured by nuclear mishaps that might not 
have occurred if the whistle blower's complaints had been investigated."). 
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preempted. As the Stokes court pointed out, however, Silkwood 
indicates that the federal government does not have preemptive 
power over '''all matters nuclear. "'158Silkwood makes clear that state 
attempts to regulate nuclear power are not automaticlllly preempted 
by the federal regulatory scheme. 159 Rather, state law is preempted 
only if it frustrates Congress's purposes. It thus becomes necessary 
to determine whether state whistle blower remedies frustrate any 
congressional objectives embodied in section 210. 
In English v. General Electric,160 the court found that state rem-
edies for nuclear whistleblowers could potentially frustrate three of 
the congressional objectives embodied in section 210, and that any 
state law claims are therefore preempted. 161 First, the court found 
that state jurisdiction over nuclear whistleblower claims could frus-
trate the congressional policy of denying relief to whistle blowers 
who by their own initiative violate nuclear regulations. 162 The court 
pointed out that a state court would not be restricted by section 
210(g).I63 Subsection (g) expressly states that section 210 will not 
protect any employee who, acting without direction from his or her 
employer, deliberately violates any nuclear regulation. l64 A whistle-
blower left unprotected by section 210 by operation of subsection (g) 
could maintain a state court action, frustrating section 21O(g)'s pur-
pose. 165 
To illustrate, the English court presented a hypothetical situation 
in which a plaintiff employee blows the whistle on a defendant em-
158 Stokes, 614 F. Supp. at 741. Silkwood made it clear to the Stokes court that, while federal 
law occupies the field of radiological safety, there is another field-whose boundaries are not 
yet fully defined-in which federal law does not preempt independent state law protections. 
ld.; cf. Bennett v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 698 S.W.2d 854, 861 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (if plaintiffs' 
recovery of personal injury damages under state tort law would merely inconvenience the 
defendant and make the operation of its business more costly, there is no frustration of federal 
policy or purpose). 
159 Stokes, 614 F. Supp. at 740-41. The Stokes court read Silkwood as putting to rest "the 
shibboleth of automatic preemption of 'all matters nuclear.'" ld. 
160 683 F. Supp. 1006 (E.D.N.C. 1988), aff'd per curiam, 871 F.2d 22 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. 
granted, 58 U.S.L. W. 3467 (U.S. Jan. 22, 1990). 
1611d. at 1013-15. But see Norris, 881 F.2d at 1150 ("We do not see how the bringing of a 
state law wrongful discharge action by an employee for a discharge based on whistle blowing 
can interfere with the safe operation of nuclear energy plants."). 
162 English, 683 F. Supp. at 1013-14. But see Gaballah v. PG & E, 711 F. Supp. 988, 990 
(N.D. Cal. 1989) (Congress intended section 210(g) to bar a federal remedy to nuclear whis-
tleblowers with unclean hands; "to say that it meant to bar them from any state law remedy 
would be pure speculation"). 
163 English, 683 F. Supp. at 1014; see 42 U.S.C. § 5851(g) (1988). 
164 See 42 U.S.C. § 5851(g). 
165 English, 683 F. Supp. at 1014. 
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ployer. The employee deliberately caused the violation she reported 
and did so without her employer's direction, and is therefore denied 
relief under section 21O(g). A state court would likewise deny relief 
under the equitable "clean hands" doctrine. 166 
If the employee deliberately caused a violation unrelated to the 
violation she reported, section 210 would still not protect her should 
she be discharged. 167 She could, however, recover in state court, 
because a state court would not be required to impose section 
210(g).168 By providing relief to a whistleblower to whom Congress 
has intended to deny relief, a state court would frustrate the congres-
sional objective embodied in section 210(g). 
The English court also found that state whistle blower remedies 
could obstruct what the court considered to be a congressional intent 
to deny punitive damages to nuclear whistleblowers. 169 The court 
claimed that Congress's failure to provide for punitive damages in 
section 210 evidenced a congressional intent to preempt state court 
remedies. 170 The court reasoned that this silence reflected Congress's 
"informed judgment" that "in no circumstances" should a nuclear 
whistleblower receive punitive damages. l7l 
Finally, the court reasoned that state jurisdiction could frustrate 
the congressional objective of providing swift resolution of nuclear 
whistleblower claims. 172 The court noted that, while states typically 
impose a two- or three-year statute of limitations,173 section 210's 
statute of limitations is thirty days.174 The court inferred that, by 
imposing such a short statute of limitations, Congress's purpose was 
to allow the regulatory authorities to discover potential hazards and 
violations that might otherwise have gone undiscovered if not for 
the thirty-day statute of limitations. 175 
166 [d. at 1013-14. The "clean hands" doctrine is an equitable principle whereby a court 
denies relief to a party who is guilty of improper conduct in the matter as to which the party 
seeks relief. [d. The doctrine derives from the equitable canon, "He who comes to equity must 
come with clean hands." D. WILLIMAN, LEGAL TERMINOLOGY 108 (1986). 
167 English, 683 F. Supp. at 1013; see also supra notes 163-66 and accompanying text. 
168 English, 683 F. Supp. at 1014. 
169 [d. 
170 [d. But see Gaballah v. PG & E, 711 F. Supp. 988, 990 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (finding that 
Congress's failure to provide for punitive damages is evidence that the section 210 remedy 
would be considered inadequate by many plaintiffs "and hence not likely to have been intended 
as exclusive by Congress"). 
171 English, 683 F. Supp. at 1014. 
172 [d. at 1014-15. 
173 See supra note 58. 
174 English, 683 F. Supp. at 1014; see also 42 U.S.C. § 5851(b)(1) (1988). 
175 English, 683 F. Supp. at 1014. 
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The court also emphasized that a short statute of limitations and 
the speed with which the Secretary must resolve a complaint176 allow 
the employee to be restored to his or her position without a sub-
stantial interruption in lifestyle or livelihood. 177 Such a quick reso-
lution also allows an employee to remain active in his or her field of 
expertise within the nuclear industry.178 
The English court's reasoning, however, is flawed. 179 A state court 
could easily avoid obstructing the congressional objective of denying 
relief to whistle blowers with "unclean hands." A state court faced 
with a whistle blower who caused a violation unrelated to the re-
ported violation could deny relief under the "clean hands" doctrine. 
Although the English court emphasized that state courts are not 
required to deny relief to such a whistleblower,180 it is within a state 
court's discretion to do so. A state court could serve the congres-
sional purpose underlying section 21O(g)181 by treating subsection (g) 
as a federal law defense available to employers in appropriate state 
court cases. 182 In Gaballah v. PG & E, 183 the court pointed out that, 
even if some state court actions were preempted by section 210(g), 
it would not be necessary to bar all wrongful discharge actions, 
including those in which subsection (g) would not be in issue. 184 
The English court is mistaken, moreover, insofar as it reads sec-
tion 210 to authorize punitive damages "in no circumstances. "185 
Section 210(d) authorizes the Secretary of Labor to file a civil action 
in federal district court to enforce an order requiring reinstatement 
of a whistle blower. 186 In such an action, a district court has authority 
under section 210 to grant "all appropriate relief," including punitive 
damages. 187 
Finally, the English court's conclusion that state remedies frus-
trate the congressional objectives embodied in section 21O's statute 
176 See 42 u.s.c. § 5851. 
177 English, 683 F. Supp. at 1014. 
178 [d. 
179 See Norris v. Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co., 881 F.2d 1144, 1150 (1st Cir. 1989); 
Gaballah v. PG & E, 711 F. Supp. 988, 990 (N.D. Cal. 1989). 
180 English, 683 F. Supp. at 1014. 
181 See 42 U.S.C. § 5851(g) (1988); see also S. REP. No. 95-848, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 29, 
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 7303. 
182 Gaballah, 711 F. Supp. at 990; accord Norris, 881 F.2d at 1150. 
183 711 F. Supp. 988 (N.D. Cal. 1989). 
184 [d. at 990; see also Noms, 881 F.2d at 1150 (section 21O(g) "presents only a speculative 
conflict not a real one"). 
185 English, 683 F. Supp. at 1014. 
186 42 U.S.C. § 5851(d). 
187 [d. 
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of limitations is particularly untenable. The court apparently as-
sumed that nuclear whistle blowers do not inform the regulatory 
authorities of employer violations until they file section 210 claims 
or sue in state court. Typically, however, whistle blowers put au-
thorities on notice of employer violations when they report their 
employers' misconduct, not when they sue for reinstatement. 188 
Thus, in the majority of cases, whether a whistleblower files a claim 
within section 210's thirty-day statute of limitations or under a longer 
state statute of limitations will not affect the ability of regulatory 
authorities to address safety violations quickly. 
Moreover, the court's decision does not further, but instead frus-
trates, the advantages of section 210's statute of limitations. The 
court reasoned that a thirty-day statute of limitations allows expe-
ditious relief for aggrieved whistleblowers.189 A longer statute of 
limitations and slower resolution of a case in court will, of course, 
delay relief to a whistle blower. It is difficult to understand, however, 
how the court's denial of relief furthers the congressional objectives 
of restoring whistle blowers to their positions and allowing them to 
remain active in their respective fields of expertise. An aggrieved 
nuclear whistleblower would presumably prefer a delayed remedy 
over no remedy at all. 
c. Is Section 210's Remedy Exclusive? 
In addition to the preemption issue, courts have grappled with a 
similar yet distinct question-whether Congress intended section 
210 to be the exclusive remedy for nuclear whistle blowers. Courts 
have disagreed on this issue. Congress has not stated that the section 
210 remedy shall be exclusive, nor has Congress expressly preserved 
state remedies. Courts, therefore, have attempted to divine congres-
sional intent from section 21O's language and legislative history. 
In Gaballah v. PG & E, 190 the court found that the section 210 
remedy is "minimal. "191 The court surmised that the remedy under 
section 210 would be considered inadequate by many plaintiffs "and 
hence not likely to have been intended as exclusive by Congress. "192 
The Stokes court disagreed, finding that section 210 provides a com-
188 See supra note 87. 
189 683 F. Supp. at 1015. 
190 711 F. Supp. 988 (N.D. Cal. 1989). 
191 [d. at 990. The court based this conclusion on the fact that section 210 affords neither 
punitive damages nor a jury trial. [d. at 990-91. 
192 [d. at 990. 
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prehensive scheme of relief. 193 The court nevertheless concluded that 
section 210 does not constitute the "panacea" for discharged nuclear 
whistleblowers.194 The court found that Congress intended section 
210 to supplement, not to supplant, state court remedies. 195 
Based on a consideration of section 21O's language and legislative 
history, the Stokes court concluded that Congress intended to pro-
vide a remedy, not the remedy, for nuclear whistleblowers. 196 The 
permissive character197 of the section 210 remedy suggested to the 
Stokes court that Congress intended to provide an elective, rather 
than a preemptive, remedy.198 From the perspective of the Stokes 
court, the legislative history199 underscored the federal remedy's 
permissive character. 200 
In Snow v. Bechtel Construction Inc. ,201 the court disagreed, hold-
ing that in spite of section 21O's permissive language , 202 it neverthe-
less provides an exclusive remedy.203 The court reasoned that it 
would make little sense for Congress to require a nuclear whistle-
blower to file a complaint204 by employing nonpermissive terms such 
as "shall." Permissive terms such as "may" and "could" are not at 
all inconsistent with a federal remedy's exclusivity.205 Consequently, 
193 Stokes v. Bechtel N. Am. Power Corp., 614 F. Supp. 732, 744 (N.D. Cal. 1985); accord 
Norris v. Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co., 881 F.2d 1144, 1151 (1st Cir. 1989); Chrisman v. 
Philips Indus., 751 P.2d 140,145 (Kan. 1988) (section 210 provides a "substantial and effective 
remedy"). 
194 Stokes, 614 F. Supp. at 743. 
195 [d. at 744. 
196 [d. (emphasis in original). 
197 [d. 42 U.S.C. § 5851(b)(I) (1988) provides that a nuclear whistleblower "may" file a 
complaint with the Secretary of Labor. 42 U.S.C. § 5851(c)(I) provides that a whistleblower 
"may obtain review" of the Secretary's order. 
198 Stokes, 614 F. Supp. at 744; accord Norris, 881 F.2d at 1147 (section 210 "permits but 
does not mandate" the filing of a claim with the Labor Department). 
199 See S. REP. No. 95-848, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 29, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 7303, 7304 (section 210 provides an administrative remedy under which a 
discharged whistle blower "could" seek redress for a section 210(a) violation). 
200 Stokes, 614 F. Supp. at 744. 
201 647 F. Supp. 1514 (C.D. Cal. 1986). 
202 See supra note 197 and accompanying text. 
203 Snow, 647 F. Supp. at 1518; accord Norman V. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 873 F.2d 
634, 637 (2d Cir. 1989). 
204 Snow, 647 F. Supp. at 1518. 
205 [d. The Snow court also pointed out that, like the Energy Reorganization Act, the 
Federal Mine Safety and Health Act (FMSHA) includes a whistle blower provision cast in 
permissive terms. See 30 U.S.C. § 815(c) (1988) (a whistleblower "may" file a complaint with 
the Secretary of Labor). Congress patterned section 210 after this provision. See S. REP. No. 
95-848, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 29, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 7303. 
The court noted that, in Olguin V. Inspiration Consolidated Copper Co., 740 F.2d 1468, 1476 
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section 21O's permissive character did not suggest to the Snow court 
that Congress intended to provide an elective, rather than an exclu-
sive, remedy. 
The United States Department of Labor's policy, however, is that 
section 210 is not exclusive. The Secretary of Labor, who is respon-
sible for enforcing section 210,206 has ruled that dismissal of a section 
210 complaint should be without prejudice, so that such a dismissal 
will not preclude a plaintiff's similar claims in state court.207 Thus, 
it appears that in the judgment of the Secretary, the section 210 
remedy supplements, rather than excludes, state remedies. 208 
As a general principle, courts, when interpreting a statute, should 
defer to the judgment of the agency to whom Congress has delegated 
authority.209 Thus, when construing section 210, courts should defer 
to the Secretary of Labor's judgment that state court remedies are 
available to nuclear whistle blowers. 
D. Other Statutes' Whistleblower Provisions 
Section 21O's legislative history21O indicates that Congress pat-
terned the nuclear whistle blower provision after similar provisions 
in the Clean Air Act (CAA),211 the Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act (FWPCA),212 and the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act 
(FMSHA).213 Judicial interpretation of these whistle blower 
provisions214 sheds some light on the issue of whether section 21O's 
remedy is exclusive. 
(9th Cir. 1984), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that, in spite of its permissive 
language, the FMSHA provides an exclusive remedy. See infra notes 216-23 and accompany-
ing text. 
206 See 42 U.S.C. § 5851(b) (1988). 
207 See English v. General Elec., 683 F. Supp. 1006, 1015 n.3 (E.D.N.C. 1988), aff'd per 
curiam, 871 F.2d 22 (4th Cir. 1989), cen. granted, 58 U.S.L.W. 3467 (U.S. Jan. 22, 1990). 
208 The English court conceded that "[p]erhaps" this is so, but the Secretary was deciding 
the issue of res judicata, not preemption. Id. 
209 See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
844 (1984) (considerable weight should be accorded to an executive department's construction 
of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer). 
210 s. REP. No. 95-848, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 29, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 7303. 
211 42 U.S.C. § 7622 (1988). 
212 33 U.S.C. § 1367 (1988). 
213 30 U.S.C. § 815(c) (1988). 
214 No court has yet decided the issue of whether the FWPCA's whistle blower provision (33 
U.S.C. § 1367) is preemptive or exclusive. 
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1. The Federal Mine Safety and Health Act 
Two courts have addressed the question of whether the FMSHA's 
whistle blower provision215 provides an exclusive remedy. In Olguin 
v. Inspiration Consolidated Copper Co. ,216 the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found the remedy to be exclusive. 217 
In Olguin, the plaintiff sued in Arizona state court, alleging that, in 
violation of the FMSHA,218 his employer discharged him in retalia-
tion for filing a safety complaint with the Mine Safety and Health 
Administration. 219 The court of appeals found that the FMSHA 220 
and section 301 of the National Labor Relations Act221 provided the 
plaintiff with sufficient remedies,222 and that these remedies were 
exclusive. 223 
In Wiggins v. Eastern Associated Coal COrp.,224 West Virginia's 
highest court reached the opposite conclusion. 225 Wiggins, a foreman 
in the defendant's coal mine, refused to operate equipment that he 
considered unsafe and the defendant fired him, in alleged violation 
of the FMSHA.226 Although the FMSHA's whistleblower provision 
does not state explicitly whether its remedy is exclusive, the defen-
dant coal company argued that, under West Virginia law, the plain-
tiff's statutory remedy is exclusive. 227 West Virginia courts have, 
however, recognized an exception to the exclusivity rule when the 
available statutory remedy is inadequate. 228 
The court conceded that the provision of a comprehensive remedial 
scheme is a strong indication of a legislative intent of exclusivity. 229 
The court found the FMSHA remedy to be limited, however, rather 
than comprehensive. 230 The damages recoverable in a tort action are 
broader than those available administratively.231 The statutory rem-
215 30 U.S.C. § 815(c). 
216 740 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1984). 
217 [d. at 1476. 
218 See 30 U.S.C. § 815(c)(I). 
219 Olguin, 740 F.2d at 1471. 
220 30 U.S.C. § 815(c)(2). 
221 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (1988). 
222 Olguin, 740 F.2d at 1475. 
223 [d. at 1476. 
224 357 S.E.2d 745 (W. Va. 1987). 
225 [d. at 748. 
226 [d. at 746. 
227 [d. at 747 (citing Lynch v. Merchants Nat'l Bank, 22 W. Va. 554, 557 (1883)). 
228 [d. (citing Price v. Boone County Ambulance Auth., 337 S.E.2d 913, 916 (W. Va. 1985)). 
229 [d. at 748. 
230 [d. 
231 See id. 
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edy provides for reinstatement, back pay, and injunctions,232 but 
these remedies do not compensate the whistle blower for such per-
sonal injuries as anguish, physical symptoms of stress, a sense of 
degradation, and the cost of psychiatric care.233 Because of the lim-
ited nature of the FMSHA's remedy, the court held that the remedy 
is not exclusive. 
The Wiggins court concluded that the limited nature of the 
FMSHA's whistleblower remedy was one factor indicating a lack of 
congressional intent to make the statutory remedy exclusive.234 The 
statute's silence on the exclusivity issue and the West Virginia rule 
that safety statutes are to be construed liberally in favor of their 
beneficiaries235 were other factors militating against a finding of 
exclusivity. 236 
2. The Clean Air Act 
In Phipps v. Clark Oil & Refining Corp. ,237 the Minnesota Court 
of Appeals held that the Clean Air Act's whistleblower provision 
does not provide an exclusive remedy.238 The court found that the 
CAA did not preclude a state law wrongful discharge claim for an 
employee who had been fired for refusing to violate CAA regula-
tions.239 
In Phipps, the defendant ordered the plaintiff to dispense leaded 
gasoline into a customer's vehicle. 240 Phipps refused, pointing out 
that CAA regulations required unleaded gasoline for that particular 
vehicle. The defendant fired Phipps, and Phipps sued in state 
court. 241 
The defendant employer argued that the CAA is a comprehensive 
statute providing sufficient remedies to carry out its policies.242 The 
defendant argued that, by including remedies in the Act, Congress 
precluded the creation of other remedies. The Minnesota Court of 
232 I d. Section 210 requires the Secretary of Labor to order any party found to have violated 
42 U.S.C. § 5851(a) (1988) to "take affirmative action to abate the violation." 42 U.S.C. 
§ 5851(b)(2)(B)(i). 
233 Wiggins, 357 S.E.2d at 748. 
234 Id. 
235Id. (citing State ex reI. Perry v. Miller, 300 S.E.2d 622, 624 (W. Va. 1983)). 
236Id. 
237 396 N.W.2d 588 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986), a/I'd, 408 N.W.2d 569 (Minn. 1987). 
238 I d. at 593. 
239Id. 
24°Id. at 589. 
241Id. 
242 I d. at 593. 
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Appeals disagreed, finding that Congress did not intend to preclude 
all other remedies.243 The court found that the plaintiff's wrongful 
discharge claim did not contravene the federal policy embodied in 
the CAA whistle blower provision. 244 Rather, the state law action 
advanced an already-declared congressional policy that employees 
who carry out the CAA's purposes should be protected from retal-
iatory discharge. 245 
The reasoning employed by the Wiggins and Phipps courts is 
persuasive. It should apply equally as well to section 210 because 
Congress patterned section 210 after the provisions at issue in these 
two cases. 246 As in the FMSHA, Congress did not state that the 
section 210 remedy is exclusive. Section 210, moreover, is a limited, 
rather than a comprehensive, remedy.247 State remedies should be 
available to help supplement the limited damages recoverable under 
section 210 and to provide for such damages as emotional distress. 
The West Virginia rule that safety statutes are to be construed 
liberally in favor of their beneficiaries should be extended to remedial 
statutes like section 210. Nuclear whistleblowers are clearly the 
intended beneficiaries of section 210. When courts construe section 
210 to be exclusive, the result is often that whistle blowers are left 
without a remedy. A liberal construction of section 210 can ensure 
that Congress's intended beneficiaries are protected from retaliation. 
The Phipps reasoning is particularly persuasive. The preemption 
doctrine is predicated on a policy of preventing states from obstruct-
ing congressional objectives. The Phipps court reasoned that allow-
ing state remedies advances, rather than obstructs, an already-
declared congressional policy of protecting whistle blowers from re-
taliation. 
This reasoning applies to section 210 as well as to the Clean Air 
Act. By enacting section 210, Congress clearly expressed its intent 
243 [d. 
244 [d.; see 42 U.S.C. § 7622 (1988). 
245 Phipps, 396 N.W.2d at 593; see also Norris v. Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co., 881 F.2d 
1144, 1151 (1st Cir. 1989) (state law actions brought by nuclear whistle blowers "may 
strengthen and expand the established public policy of protecting whistle blowers in the 
nuclear energy industry"); cf. Lally v. Copygraphics, 85 N.J. 668, 670-71, 428 A.2d 1317,1318 
(1981) (allowing a common-law wrongful discharge action in addition to an administrative 
remedy provided by state workers' compensation statute on the grounds that a judicial remedy 
"will effectuate statutory objectives" and complement legislative policies). 
246 See S. REP. No. 95-848, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 29, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 7303; see also supra notes 210-13 and accompanying text. 
247 Gaballah V. PG & E, 711 F. Supp. 988, 990-91 (N.D. Cal. 1989); see also supra notes 92-
95 and accompanying text. 
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to protect the job security of nuclear whistleblowers. Congress did 
not express any intent to make the section 210 remedy exclusive. If 
a court infers such an intent and denies relief to a whistle blower, 
the court clearly contravenes the stated policy of protecting whistle-
blowers from retaliatory discharge. It is difficult to understand why 
such a clear expression of congressional intent should be frustrated 
in favor of an inferred intent to provide an exclusive remedy, which 
is supported by neither section 210's text nor its legislative history. 248 
V. THE UNIFORM HEALTH AND SAFETY WHISTLEBLOWERS 
PROTECTION ACT 
Senator Howard Metzenbaum of Ohio has introduced a bill that 
would resolve the issue of whether federal statutory whistle blower 
remedies preempt state remedies. The proposed Uniform Health 
and Safety Whistle blowers Protection Act249 would provide a remedy 
for all private-sector employees who suffer any retaliation for re-
porting their employers' violations of federal law. 250 The Act would 
grant any such whistle blower the right to seek an administrative 
remedy with the United States Department of Labor.251 The pro-
posed law would provide expressly that its remedy would be in 
addition to, not in lieu of, any available state law remedies. 252 
If Congress passes this bill, it would resolve the preemption issue 
by affirming that the federal whistle blower remedy is not exclu-
sive. 253 This does not mean, however, that a discharged nuclear 
whistle blower could then bring a wrongful discharge action in any 
jurisdiction in the United States. Many jurisdictions do not provide 
a remedy for discharged whistleblowers.254 
It is possible, moreover, that state courts could find the federal 
remedy to be the nuclear whistle blower's exclusive remedy in spite 
of the language of the proposed Act. Courts could find that nuclear 
whistle blower protection constitutes nuclear safety regulation,255 and 
is therefore preempted by the federal remedy. 
248 See Norris, 881 F.2d at 1150 ("[Tlhere is nothing in the words of the statute or its 
legislative history indicating a congressional intent to bar a whistle blower from bringing a 
state action for wrongful discharge."). 
249 S. 2095, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); H.R. 4305, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988). 
250 [d. § 5. 
251 [d. 
252 [d. § 8(a). 
253 See id. 
254 See supra notes 33-43 and accompanying text. 
255 See supra notes 138-46 and accompanying text. 
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State courts could also limit nuclear whistle blowers to the federal 
remedy based upon state common-law rules regarding exclusive rem-
edies. 256 These rules are based on state policy, not congressional 
intent,257 so they would remain binding regardless of any congres-
sional intent to insure that the federal remedy is not construed to 
be exclusive. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Congress and a host of states have recognized the importance of 
whistle blowing and have enacted statutory protections for whistle-
blowers. Section 210 represents unmistakable evidence that Con-
gress intends nuclear whistle blowers to be protected from unjust 
discharge. Courts should adhere to this clear congressional intent 
and should not obstruct it by reading into section 210 an unexpressed 
intent to provide an exclusive nuclear whistle blower remedy. Al-
though nuclear whistleblowing, and the protection provided by sec-
tion 210, have the beneficial effect of promoting nuclear safety, sec-
tion 210's primary purpose is to protect the whistleblower, not to 
promote safety. Section 210, then, is not part of the federal scheme 
of nuclear regulation. Finding section 210 to be preemptive often 
leaves the nuclear whistleblower with no available remedy. It is 
painfully obvious that, in the case of section 210, preemption defeats, 
rather than serves, congressional objectives. 
The proposed Uniform Health and Safety Whistleblowers Protec-
tion Act would resolve the preemption controversy, but would not 
be a panacea for discharged whistle blowers who seek state court 
remedies. There are still many jurisdictions that do not provide a 
tort remedy for whistleblowers. In most states, wrongful discharge 
is a recent development in the law, and the parameters of the public 
policy exception are still evolving. One can only hope that more 
states recognize the merits of whistleblowing and see the need to 
create a judicial remedy for whistleblowers. Whistleblowing should 
be rewarded and appreciated. When whistle blowers are punished 
for their actions, the courts should provide them with the protection 
they deserve. 
256 See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
257 See id. 
